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INTRODUCTION
The important thing in [athletic competition] is not to win but to take
part; the important thing in life is not the triumph but the struggle.
Pierre de Coubertin, founder of modern Olympics
Over twenty years ago, Congress passed Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 mandating gender equity in federally funded educa-
tional institutions.' Since that time, however, women have made little real
progress in achieving equality in intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics.
Seven years after Congress passed Title IX, the Department of Health, Ed-
ucation and Welfare found women made up only 30% of the intercollegi-
ate athletes, but made up 48% of national undergraduate enrollment.2 In
the 1990s, despite over twenty years of Title IX's clear mandate against sex
discrimination, women still make up only one third of Division I intercol-
legiate athletes, even though women actually make up over 50% of all col-
lege students enrolled. 3 Women athletes still lag well behind men in
terms of financial assistance, operating dollars, and athletic participation
opportunities afforded to them by their schools. Through weak enforce-
ment of Title IX by the Office of Civil Rights, and alleged "voluntary com-
pliance" efforts by educational institutions, Title IX had proved nothing
more than placebo legislation with no real remedial effect on gender ine-
quality in athletics.
Effective litigation under Title IX has begun to change all that. In the
last few years, women athletes have taken Title IX enforcement into their
own hands and taken their educational institutions to court. No longer
satisfied with administrative complaints, informal requests, or strategic
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988).
2. See Tide IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, app. A at 71,419 (1979) [hereinafter Final
Policy Interpretation] (stating 1977-78 national averages).




protests4 as their weapons against gender inequality in athletics, women
athletes have enlisted attorneys to champion their cause for equality
through litigation.
Although Title IX is over two decades old, litigation aimed at federally
funded educational institutions' athletic departments is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Four new cases have addressed some of the issues
presented by this type of litigation. 5 These cases, however, have only
scratched the surface of the issues presented by Title IX litigation aimed at
intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics. Many issues, both procedural
and substantive, remain unresolved by the courts. Using the course of liti-
gation as a logical outline, this article explores the substantive and proce-
dural issues presented by Title IX litigation in athletics. As background,
the article first discusses the history of Title IX as it applies to athletics and
the recent victories and defeats by women athletes in litigation aimed at
bringing gender equity to intercollegiate athletics.
The article further discusses the prima facie elements of Title IX dis-
crimination claims brought against educational institutions' athletic de-
partments and legitimate affirmative defenses to those claims. Although
courts in recent federal cases have found Title IX violations by schools,
those courts failed to provide consistent methods of analysis by which fu-
ture courts and litigants can gauge an educational institution's conduct.
Thus, using statutory, regulatory and practical guidelines, this article
presents a method of analysis for evaluating whether Title IX has indeed
been violated. In particular, the article explores at what level of female
athletic participation an educational institution will be found to be provid-
ing equal athletic opportunity to women in compliance with Title IX.
Finally, the article explores the remedies which are or should be avail-
able to athletes who successfully prove Title IX violations. In particular,
this article presents scholarly debate of the availability of monetary dam-
ages for Title IX violations, extrapolating from and analyzing analogous
statutes and Supreme Court decisions. Unlike other commentaries, this
article concludes monetary damages should be available under Title IX
even in instances of unintentional, or disparate impact, discrimination.
4. In 1976, the Yale women's crew team sought shower facilities in their boathouse.
Polite protest went unheard. To get shower facilities, the women resorted to what has be-
come known as the "Title IX strip"; the women painted the letters of Title IX on their bare
backs and chests and disrobed for, among others, a New York Times photographer. Before
resorting to such drastic measures, they had been reminded by the school administrators that
the athletes were there to improve their athletic skills, not to powder their noses. See
Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE
L.J. 1731, 1762 (1991); see also Yale Women Strip to Protest a Lack of Crew's Showers, N.Y. TIMES,
March 4, 1976, at A33.
5. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888
(lst Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d
332 (3d Cir. 1993).
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I. HISTORY OF TITLE IX As IT APPLIES TO ATHLETICS
Congress passed Title IX as a result of perceived gender discrimina-
tion in federally funded educational institutions. In relevant part, Title IX
reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 6
Title IX serves two main federal objectives: (1) to restrict the use of
federal funds from supporting institutions engaging in discrimination;
and (2) to protect individuals from that discrimination. 7 To meet these
objectives, Congress explicitly granted authority to effectuate the provi-
sions of Title IX to federal agencies that extend financial assistance to any
educational institution, program, or activity. 8 The Department of Educa-
tion has been the primary agency enforcing the Title.
9
In 1974, the Department of Education's predecessor, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"), submitted proposed regula-
tions implementing Title IX. 10 The regulations ("Regulations"), signifi-
cantly revised from those proposed, were finally signed into law by
President Gerald Ford on May 27, 1975.11 Unlike Title IX itself, the Regu-
lations explicitly address Tide IX's application to athletics offered by fed-
erally funded educational institutions.' 2 In this regard, the Regulations
require educational institutions to provide "equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes."1 3 The Regulations also explicitly address the
provision of scholarship monies by federally funded educational institu-
tions. 14 The Regulations gave educational institutions three years to com-
ply with its equal athletic opportunity requirements.1 5 That period
expired on July 21, 1978.16
Because Title IX called for the withdrawal of federal financial assist-
ance from educational institutions that violated the statute's provisions,
many educational institutions cried out for a clear delineation of the stat-
ute's requirements. 17 In response, HEW published a proposed Policy In-
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
7. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
9. See Note, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools: The Supreme Court Implies a
Damages Remedyfor Title IX Sex Discrimination, 45 VAND. L. Ray. 1367, 1368 & n.11 (1992).
10. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1974) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (1993)) (proposed June 20,
1974).
11. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531-33 (1982); Final Policy Inter-
pretation, supra note 2, at 71,413 (detailing history of regulation); Diane Heckman, Women &
Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX 9 U. MiAmi ENr. & SpoRrs L. Rav. 1, 12-13
(1992).
12. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1993).
13. 34 C.F.RL § 106.41(c) (1993).
14. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (1993).
15. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1993).
16. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,413.
17. See Heckman, supra note 11, at 13; see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at
71,413 (discussing filing of 100 complaints against over 50 educational institutions during
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terpretation on December 11, 1978, to give further guidance to
educational institutions in providing equal athletic opportunity to mem-
bers of both sexes.18 After comments and revisions, HEW issued a Final
Policy Interpretation on December 11, 1979, specifically addressing inter-
collegiate athletic programs.1 9 HEW intended the Final Policy Interpreta-
tion's general principles to apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic
athletics as well.20 Although not reviewed or approved by Congress, the
Final Policy Interpretation, as the definitive, published interpretation of
the agency charged with implementing Title IX and its accompanying
Regulations, is entitled to substantial deference by the courts.
2 1
Despite the explicit language of the Regulations and the Final Policy
Interpretation, several courts and commentators struggled with the issue
of whether Title IX could apply to a specific program within an educa-
tional institution if that program did not receive direct federal financial
assistance. 22 The "program-specific" debate was seemingly resolved when
the Supreme Court decided Grove City College v. BelL23 There, the
Supreme Court definitively ruled that federal financial assistance received
by students did not inure to the benefit of the college as a whole but only
to the financial aid department. Thus, Title IX only prohibited sex dis-
crimination in the financial aid department and not in the school as a
whole.24 Following the Supreme Court, lower courts refused to apply Ti-
tle IX to athletic programs because few, if any, receive direct federal
funding.
25
three year grace period and university community's lack of guidance in complying with
Regulations).
18. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,413 (describing process of pro-
posed Policy Interpretation and comments).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.) (deferring
substantially to the Final Policy Interpretation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); see also
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n., 499 U.S. 144, 149-50 (1991) (defer-
ring to Commission's interpretation). This deference to the Final Policy Interpretation is
supported by the Supreme Court's analysis of the analogous EEOC Guidelines interpreting
Title VII. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (holding the EEOC
Guidelines "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance") (citations omitted); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1991) ("The administrative interpretation of [Title VII] by the enforc-
ing agency is entitled to great deference."). Congress's failure to take any action disapprov-
ing the Final Policy Interpretation, particularly since Congress has addressed Title IX twice
since 1979, creates a strong inference that Congress endorses HEW's interpretation. See
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982).
22. Compare, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 700 (3rd Cir. 1982) (support-
ing institution-wide approach), aff'd, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) with Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d
992 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (supporting program-specific approach), vacated as moot,
456 U.S. 986 (1982).
23. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
24. Id. at 572.
25. See, e.g., Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 799 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
ministerial relationship between financial aid department, which received federal funds, and
athletic program insufficient to bring the latter under Title IX). On the general lack of
direct receipt of federal financial assistance by intercollegiate athletic programs, see Note, Sex
Discrimination in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IowA L. REv. 420, 469 (1975); B. Glenn George,
Miles to Go and Prmises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX 64 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 555, 558 & n.16
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Congress, however, had the last word in the "program-specific" debate
when it overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell
with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987:
The Congress finds that-(1) certain aspects of recent decisions
and opinions of the Supreme Court . .. cast doubt upon the
broad application of title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 ... and (2) legislative action is necessary to restore the prior
consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation
and broad, institution-wide application of those laws as previously
administered.
26
Under the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Title IX's prohibitions against sex
discrimination apply institution-wide to any educational institution receiv-
ing federal financial assistance in any form.
2 7
In addition to the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation, the
Department of Education, through the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"),
further interpreted Title IX as it applied to athletics by issuing the Title IX
Athletics Investigator's Manual ("Investigator's Manual").2 8 The manual
was designed to assist OCR investigators in their investigations of intercol-
legiate and interscholastic athletic programs.2 9 For the same reasons the
Final Policy Interpretation is given great deference, 30 so too should the
Investigator's Manual receive deference from the courts. Unlike the Final
Policy Interpretation, however, the Investigator's Manual is an internal
agency document which was not subject to public notice and comment.
Therefore, any inconsistencies between the Final Policy Interpretation and
the Investigator's Manual must be resolved in favor of the Final Policy In-
terpretation as the implementing agency's authoritative interpretation of
the Regulations.
The Investigator's Manual is divided into thirteen areas that address
specific components of athletics programs. These areas are discussed be-
low in relation to litigation initiated under Title IX.
(1993). At least one lower court, however, found Title IX applied to an institution's athletic
department. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 537-38 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding
athletic scholarships are subject to Title IX scrutiny because federal financial support is given
to financial aid department and athletic scholarships are a part of that department).
26. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)); see also West Virginia Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-
14 (1991)).
27. Id. The retroactive application of the Civil Rights Restoration Act is now irrelevant.
Only cases pending before the Act would need to address retroactivity. Whether the Act is
retroactive or not, evidence of discrimination prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act is relevant and admissible to prove that an institution's present conduct perpetu-
ates past discrimination. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 396 n.6 (1986) (Brennan,J.,
concurring); EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 1974).
28. VALERIE M. BONNErE & LAmtu DANIEL, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RiGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter INVESTIGATOR'S
MANUAL].
29. See id. at [i].
30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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II. RECENT ATHLEIcs LITIGATION UNDER TrrLE IX
Federal Courts have heard and decided a handful of key Tide IX
cases dealing with gender equity in athletics within the last few years.
These cases have been and will continue to be central to the evolving legal
issues in determining the application of Tide IX's gender equity directive
to athletics. This section briefly discusses these important cases and sets
the scene for a discussion of issues that have been or will be pursued by
women athletes under Tide IX.
A. Roberts v. Colorado State University3 l
In Roberts, the Colorado State University women's softball team filed
suit in their individual capacities to have their team reinstated after its
abrupt termination by the University. The women softball players sued
under the interests and abilities compliance area of Title IX,3 2 alleging
Colorado State failed to provide equal athletic opportunity to women in its
federally funded athletic department.
33
The federal district court found Colorado State in violation of the
interests and abilities compliance area and granted the softball players a
permanent injunction requiring Colorado State to reinstate the softball
team with all incidental benefits accorded other varsity sports at Colorado
State.3 4 The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
Tenth Circuit ruled the district court had overstepped its authority by or-
dering Colorado State to organize a fall season of play for the softball team
that had not been the practice at Colorado State prior to the team's termi-
nation.35 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit agreed Colorado State was in
violation of Title IX's interests and abilities compliance area and fully sup-
ported the district court's order to reinstate the softball team.
3 6
B. Cohen v. Brown University
3 7
In Cohen, members of the women's gymnastics and volleyball teams
brought a class action suit seeking a preliminary injunction to reinstate the
varsity status of their teams. The women athletes alleged a violation of the
interests and abilities compliance area of Title IX and presented evidence
of unequal treatment in receiving other athletic benefits. 38 The district
court agreed with the women athletes and granted a preliminary injunc-
tion restoring women's gymnastics and volleyball to varsity status and man-
dating adequate funding and benefits to those reinstated teams. 39 The
31. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub noam. Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 580 (1993).
32. See infra section IV.A.3.
33. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1510-11.
34. Id. at 1518-19.
35. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 835.
36. Id. at 832-34.
37. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 994-97.
39. Id. at 1001.
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First Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction order in
full.40
C. Cook v. Colgate University4
Cook involved claims by the women's club ice hockey team, in their
individual capacities, that Colgate's refusal to upgrade them to varsity sta-
tus violated Title IX. The women athletes alleged a violation of the other
athletic benefits compliance area,42 stating that the men's ice hockey
team, and the men's athletics program as a whole, received far greater
benefits in such areas as equipment, funding, travel, and coaching.4 3 The
magistrate judge at the district court level ordered Colgate to grant varsity
status to the women's ice hockey team and to supply the team with
"equivalent athletic opportunities.""4 The Second Circuit vacated the or-
der and remanded the case.4 5 Since the athletes brought their claims in
their individual capacities, not as representatives of the hockey team, and
because the last of the plaintiffs would graduate before the order to up-
grade the team could take effect, the Second Circuit ruled their claims
were moot and remanded the action with orders to dismiss the
complaint.
46
D. Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania
47
In Favia, athletes on the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams
brought a class action suit against Indiana University of Pennsylvania
("IUP") seeking reinstatement of their teams. Like the plaintiffs in Roberts,
the Favia plaintiffs alleged a violation of the interests and abilities compli-
ance area of Title IX. The district court agreed that IUP failed to provide
equal athletic opportunity to women and ruled IUP was in violation of
Title IX. 48 The Third Circuit affirmed and denied IUP's motion to mod-
ify the injunction. 49 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit suggested an appro-
priate order for final injunctive relief should focus not so much on the
interests of the representative plaintiffs, but instead, should allow IUP to
institute women's sports other than gymnastics or field hockey which
could meet the needs of more women athletes.
50
40. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 907 (1st Cir. 1993).
41. 802 F. Supp 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. See infra section IV.A.2.
43. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-45.
44. Id. at 751.
45. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
46. Id.
47. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
48. Id. at 584-85.
49. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 344 (3d Cir. 1993).
50. See id. at 344.
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III. PARTIES TO TITLE IX ATHLETICS LITIGATION
A. Private Right of Action Established in Cannon v. University of Chicago
Tide IX began as a public remedy statute wherein federal administra-
tive agencies were given authority to withdraw federal funds from educa-
tional institutions that discriminated on the basis of sex.5 1 For several
years after Tide IX's passage, courts interpreted Tide IX's relief provisions
to foreclose any private right of action by individuals who were harmed as
a result of an educational institution's discriminatory practice.5 2 Thus, Ti-
de IX was relegated to "administrative legislation" whereby administrative
agencies had discretion to pursue individual claims against an educational
institution. In such claims, an individual complainant had no participa-
tion in the investigation or subsequent enforcement proceedings.
53
In 1978, the Supreme Court gave the reins of Tide IX to the individu-
als it was meant to protect.54 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,55 the
Supreme Court found Title IX implied a private right of action for individ-
uals harmed by the discriminatory practices of a federally funded educa-
tional institution.56 The Court so held because (1) Tide IX was enacted
for the benefit of a specific class,5 7 (2) Congress intended to create a pri-
vate right of action,58 (3) a private action would not frustrate the underly-
ing purpose of Tide IX,59 and (4) implying a federal remedy would not
infringe states' rights.60 Thus began the enforcement of individuals'
rights under Tide IX through private litigation.
B. Title IX Plaintiffs
Under Title IX, an appropriate plaintiff is any person who is excluded
from, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any
educational program which receives federal funds.6 1 As expressed by the
Court in Cannon, persons who are "private victims of discrimination" are
51. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682 (1988).
52. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 1976) (hold-
ing female applicant twice denied admission to medical school had no right of action against
the institution under Title IX), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
53. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41 (1979) (describing adminis-
trative enforcement process).
54. Congress's intent to protect individual women from discrimination is evident from
Tide IX's legislative history. Congress passed Title IX with the express intent to provide solid
legal protection to women as they seek education and training for later careers. See 118
CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972) (comments of Sen. Bayh); see aLso Final Policy Interpretation,
supra note 2, at 71,423 (stating legislative history of Title IX demonstrates it was enacted
because of discrimination against women in educational institutions).
55. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
56. Id. at 709.
57. Id. at 694.
58. Id. at 703 (analogizing to Title VI remedies in which the Court understood Congress
authorized private causes of action for victims of prohibited discrimination).
59. d. at 703-04 (identifying purposes of Title IX as (1) avoiding use of federal funds to
support discrimination, and (2) providing individual citizens effective protection against
discrimination).
60. Id. at 708-09.
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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entitled to bring a claim under the statute. 62 This section explores the
standing of individuals and organizations to bring Title IX claims against
educational institutions' athletics departments allegedly violating Title IX.
1. Female Athletes: Individual Claims and Class Action Suits
Individual female athletes who allege they have been excluded from,
denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under their educa-
tional program obviously fit squarely within Title IX's standing provi-
sion. 63 Indeed, Title IX's focus, as it applies to athletics, is on the
protection of individual students' rights, not the rights of any group or
subgroup of students.
64
This focus on the individual's rights, however, does not prevent indi-
viduals from joining together against an educational institution in a single
lawsuit. Indeed, courts have allowed women to maintain class action suits
on behalf of entire teams or on behalf of all present and future female
students at an institution who participate in or are deterred from partici-
pating in intercollegiate athletics. 65 Certain consequences will result at
the remedial stage of trial depending on whether plaintiffs bring their
claims as individuals or in class actions. For example, an individual plain-
tiff may be able to recover monetary damages and specific injunctive re-
lief, but may be faced with mootness problems for prospective injunctive
relief. A class of athletes or students, on the other hand, may not face the
mootness argument, but may lack standing to request specific injunctive
relief, such as the reinstatement of a particular team.66 Thus, special at-
tention must be paid early on to the form of the suit and the remedy
sought.
2. Coaches and Tutors
Coaches and tutors are an integral part of interscholastic and intercol-
legiate athletics and, as such, are afforded protection under Title IX from
sex discrimination. 6 7 Where a coach is denied benefits by an educational
institution on the basis of his or her sex, Title IX offers a remedy to that
individual. 68 Nevertheless, these coaches or tutors must seek to vindicate
their own rights, not those of the student athletes they coach or teach.
The Regulations governing individual athletes' rights do not afford
coaches and tutors any protection. Instead, coaches and tutors are af-
62. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709.
63. See id.
64. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422.
65. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 979.
66. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833 (dictum). For a full discussion of the remedial conse-
quences of the plaintiffs' status, see infra notes 259 to 297 and accompanying text.
67. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982) (reading Title IX to




forded protections as employees of the educational institutions and are gov-
erned by different provisions of the Regulations.
69
Recently, female coaches have filed lawsuits under Title IX and other
employment provisions alleging unequal pay and treatment as a result of
their sex.70 While these suits are a fascinating new development in the
movement toward gender equity in intercollegiate athletics, this article
does not discuss the elements of these employment disputes.
3. Women's Organizations and Player Associations
Organizations or associations whose members are likely to suffer
harm as a result of unlawful discrimination by educational institutions are
potential plaintiffs in a Title IX suit. For example, organizations that rep-
resent women's interests or, more specifically, women athletes' interests,
may bring suit under Tide IX. An association may have standing to sue as
the representative of its individual members: "injury to the association's
members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in
federal court on their behalf."7 1 Thus, as long as the organization can
satisfy the three-part test required for associational standing, the organiza-
tion may file suit to enforce Title IX.
The three-part test requires that "(a) [the association's] members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participa-
tion of individual members in the lawsuit." 72 The National Organization
for Women employed this associational standing doctrine to represent its
members in a California suit brought under Tide IX.
73
In choosing to bring an action on behalf of their members, however,
associations must be prepared to accept limited remedies that may give
ultimate control over compliance methods to the educational institutions.
Like the remedies available in class actions, the remedies available to a
representative organization are limited to general prospective injunctive
relief that will benefit the class as a whole. 74 Monetary relief will likely not
be recoverable. 75 Moreover, the educational institution may be allowed to
69. 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (1993) (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions).
70. See, e.g., Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. International Union, UAWv. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281 (1985); see aLso Hunt v. Wash-
ington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (discussing in general an
organization's standing to sue on behalf of its employees); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (same); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 729 (1972)
(same).
72. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
73. . See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, California Nat'l Org. for Wo-
men v. Evans (No. 728548) (filed in the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of Santa Clara, February 3, 1993) (settled before trial).
74. See infra notes 259 to 297 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
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direct its own compliance efforts rather than being judicially directed or
"micromanaged."76
4. Men
Men have standing to bring suits under Title IX if they can establish
they have been discriminated against or denied equal benefits on the basis
of sex. This begs the question, however, whether a suit under Title IX can
be successful when brought on behalf of men. Male athletes will have dif-
ficulty establishing a prima facie case 77 under Title IX or its Regulations
since male athletes are the overrepresented gender in virtually every ath-
letic department in the country. 78 The only court that has decided a case
brought by male athletes under Title IX granted summary judgment
against the plaintiffs because it found Title IX afforded no protection to
the male athletes before it. In Kelley v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois,79 male athletes brought a Title IX suit alleging sex discrimination
because the University of Illinois had terminated their varsity swimming
team while retaining the women's swimming team. In granting summary
judgment for the university, the district court ruled that male athletes
were not entitled to protection at the University of Illinois because male
athletic participation percentages exceeded male undergraduate enroll-
ment percentages.8 0 While the plain meaning of Title IX would seem to
outlaw a school's decision to cut one team over another on the basis of
sex, the Regulations and the Final Policy Interpretation allow (and cases
have allowed) affirmative actions taken on behalf of the underrepresented
gender,8 ' traditionally women. "Quite frankly, these interpretations [in
the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation] have converted Title IX
from a statute which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex (defined
as the elimination of or exclusion from participation opportunities), into a
statute which provides 'equal opportunity for members of both sexes.' "82
Despite this conclusion by the Kelley court that Title IX has somehow
been transformed by the Regulations and the Final Policy Interpretation,
the legislative history behind Title IX demonstrates Congress intended it
to serve primarily as a remedy for current discrimination in educational
76. See infra notes 283 to 288 and accompanying text.
77. See infra part IVA
78. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55 (stating that national average for Division I women
athletic participation is approximately 30%, while national female college enrollment is ap-
proximately 50%); see also Steve Wieberg, Title IX: 20 Years After, A New Call for Action, USA
TODAY, June 8, 1992, at CIO (reporting on 86 Division I-A schools and finding that only 12
provided women's athletics more than 30% of total athletic funding).
79. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, No. 93-3205, 1994 WL 473875 (7th Cir. Sept.
1, 1994).
80. Id. at 242.
81. See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.3(b), 106.41(c) (1993) (allowing affirmative action
and requiring equal opportunity, respectively); Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at
71,416 (voluntary affirmative action measures are legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
unequal treatment of male and female teams).
82. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 241.
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institutions against women.8 3 Thus, whether Tide IX is labeled as "anti-
discrimination" or "affirmative action" legislation, the Regulations and the
Final Policy Interpretation have expanded Tide IX's legislative directive to
equalize federally financed educational opportunities for women with
those opportunities already provided to men. This expansion must be re-
garded as an implementation of the legislative purpose behind Tide IX
and not as a transformation of the statute as concluded by Kelley.
Consequently, although male athletes have technical standing to
bring suit under Tide IX, their suits will be subject to an immediate mo-
tion to dismiss, which will likely be granted, unless they can prove they are
underrepresented in the athletic department. 84 While men may argue
this "affirmative action" approach violates constitutional principles of
equal protection, federal courts have long recognized that acts taken and
legislation passed by governmental entities for the benefit of an histori-
cally deprived group will withstand constitutional challenge. 8 5 Moreover,
the current exclusion of men from Tide IX's remedy is not offensive as
long as men continue to receive disproportionately higher athletic oppor-
tunities than women. Title IX was passed as a result of women's need for
solid legal protection as they seek education and training for their later
careers.86 Once an educational institution establishes athletic participa-
tion equality, either gender will be able to bring suit under Title IX for
actions taken by an educational institution motivated by gender considera-
tions or which unfairly impact one gender. Until that time, however, men
are protected by institutional and historical biases operating in their favor,
obviating the current need for Title IX protection.
C. Title IX Defendants
Any educational institution receiving federal funds that allegedly fails
to provide a discrimination-free athletic department will be subject to suit
under Title IX. 8 7 An "educational institution" is defined as:
any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school,
or any institution of vocational, professional or higher education,
except that in the case of an educational institution composed of
more than one school, college, or department which are admin-
83. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,423. "Millions of women pay taxes
into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for the
support of institutions to which we are denied equal access." 117 CONG. REc. 39,252 (1971)
(comments of Rep. Mink). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.36
(1979) (discussing legislative intent of Title IX). Title IX was passed "in view of the scope
and depth of discrimination" against women in educational institutions. H.R. REP. No. 554,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512.
84. In Cohen, the First Circuit rejected Brown's claim that effective accommodation for
women athletes violates the equal protection rights of men athletes. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900-
01. The court held that Congress had broad authority to remedy past discrimination and
had intended to do so under Title IX. Id. at 901.
85. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
86. See 118 CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972) (comments of Sen. Bayh).
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
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istratively separate units, such term means each such school, col-
lege, or department.
8
Certain types of educational institutions, such as military institutions, are
excluded from Title IX's reach.8 9 Individual universities, colleges, and
schools are traditional defendants in Title IX litigation. Depending on
the charter of the educational institution, however, the proper defendant
in place of the institution may be a governing body, for example, the Colo-
rado State Board of Agriculture (which governs Colorado State
University).90
At the secondary and post-secondary levels, separate schools and col-
leges often form together to form athletic groups or associations. The
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") is such a group; it is "a
voluntary association of public and private institutions."9 1 In defining the
term "educational institution," Title IX refers to the individual schools or
colleges within these groups. Thus, Title IX directs that the proper de-
fendant is not the NCAA itself, but the individual members of the NCAA.
This is especially true since the rules of the NCAA, or other such group,
are subject to change by vote of the individual members.
92
The Eleventh Amendment 93 serves as no protection to liability. State
run schools are deemed to have waived Eleventh Amendment immunity
by accepting federal funds.
94
IV. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN TITLE IX ATHLETICS CASES: CASE ELEMENTS
AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A. Stating a Prima Facie Athletics Case Under Title IX: Three Types of
Violations
The Regulations, Final Policy Interpretation, and the Investigator's
Manual all set out three areas in which an educational institution must
comply in order to avoid a Title IX violation in its athletics department.
95
These areas, referred to throughout this article as compliance areas, are:
(1) athletic financial assistance; (2) other athletic benefits and opportuni-
ties; and (3) accommodation of athletics interests and abilities.9 6 The Fi-
nal Policy Interpretation sets the three compliance areas apart as separate
considerations, even though the Regulations combine the second and
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1988).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(1)-(9).
90. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 827.
91. Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984).
92. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422 (suggesting suit must be
against individual institutions to change NCAA rules, since compliance with NCAA rules does
not serve as defense to member institutions).
93. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1988).
95. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41(c)(1)-(10) (1993); Final Policy Interpretation, supra
note 2, at 71,415-17; INVESrnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7.
96. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17; INVEsTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 7.
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third compliance areas.9 7 Moreover, the Investigator's Manual states, "the
[Final] Policy Interpretation does permit separate investigations and find-
ings for three major areas" and goes on to delineate the three compliance
areas.
98
Educational institutions have argued that Title IX requires a program-
wide analysis, pointing to the Regulations and the Investigator's Manual as
support for this approach.9 9 Specifically, the Investigator's Manual calls
for a balancing of all compliance areas against each other to determine if
there is overall compliance with Title IX. 10 0 Thus, schools have argued
that a violation of a single compliance area cannot state a valid claim
under Title IX.1°1
Nevertheless, courts have found that failure to provide equal treat-
ment to female athletes in any one of the three compliance areas laid out
in the Final Policy Interpretation gives rise to a violation under Title IX.
10 2
"Although § 106.41(c) [of the Regulations] goes on to list nine other fac-
tors that enter into a determination of equal opportunity in athletics, an
institution may violate Title IX simply by failing to effectively accommo-
date the interest and abilities of student athletes of both sexes."' 0 3 The
same logic dictates that a violation of the financial assistance or other ath-
letic benefits compliance areas states a separate, valid claim under Title
IX, although no court has addressed the issue.
This article analyzes each compliance area. Particular emphasis is
given to the third compliance area, accommodation of athletic interests
and abilities, because it forms the cornerstone of Title IX as it applies to
athletics.
1. Financial Assistance Compliance Area
The first compliance area relates to the financial assistance or scholar-
ships an educational institution provides to its student athletes. Scholar-
ships are specifically governed by section 106.37(c) of the Regulations.
10 4
"[Institutions] must provide reasonable opportunities for [athletic scholar-
97. Compare Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17 with 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41 (c) (1)-(10).
98. Ihwr.rIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7.
99. See, e.g., Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 988-89 (defendants arguing "that Title IX requires a
program-wide analysis to determine compliance," not a single violation of 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41 (c) (1)).
100. INVESGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7 (suggesting, in general, an overall ap-
proach that reviews the entire athletic program).
101. See, e.g., Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1510-11 (defendants arguing that "the Investigator's
Manual requires that plaintiffs demonstrate an overall violation of either 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.37(c) or 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)-(10) in order to sustain a claim of discrimination
under Title IX").
102. See Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 742 (rejecting Colgate's argument that overall compliance
with Title IX in the athletic department as a whole insulates Colgate from liability for specific
Title IX violations); see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828 (holding interests and abilities violation
sufficient to find Tide IX violation); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897 (holding failure to accommodate
interests and abilities sufficient for Title IX violation).
103. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828 (citation omitted).
104. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
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ship] awards for members of each sex in proportion to the number of
students of each sex participating in ... intercollegiate athletics."
1 0 5
The Final Policy Interpretation clearly defines the standard for mea-
suring compliance in this area. The OCR and courts are to divide the
amount of financial assistance to members of each sex by the number of
male or female participants 10 6 in the athletic program. If the comparison
results in a substantially equal amount or the school can offer nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for a disparity, the school has satisfied this compliance
area.10 7 The compliance area does not require a proportionate number of
scholarships; rather, it requires an amount of financial assistance propor-
tionate to men's and women's participation rates.10 8 In analyzing these
amounts, non-grant aid, such as work-study, also must be compared. 1° 9
In assessing an institution's purported nondiscriminatory reasons for
disparities in the amount of awards to men and women, the courts should
exercise caution. The Final Policy Interpretation sets out examples of al-
leged nondiscriminatory reasons that educational institutions put forth
during the notice and comment period for the proposed Policy Interpre-
tation. For example, the Final Policy Interpretation suggests a school may
provide unequal amounts of aid where more students of one gender hail
from out of state. 110 Yet, the OCR's experience in investigating schools
revealed that this alleged nondiscriminatory reason for unequal financial
assistance to women athletes could be the result of another discriminatory
practice by the institution, namely greater out-of-state recruiting for the
men's athletic program.11 1 "A disparity in recruitment of student athletes
may not be used to justify a disparity in athletic financial assistance."
12
Likewise, other discriminatory practices by the institution cannot be used
to justify disproportionate amounts of financial assistance to members of
each sex.
In measuring the proportionality of financial assistance, the OCR em-
ploys complicated statistical analyses known as the "Z"
113 and "T"1 14
tests.1 15 Where the percentage of athletes who are female is not propor-
105. Id.
106. The Final Policy Interpretation defines "participants" as those athletes who: "receive
institutionally-sponsored support normally provided to athletes" (e.g. coaching, equipment);
"are participating in organized practice sessions and other team meetings ... on a regular
basis"; "are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained for each sport"; or "[wiho, be-
cause of injury, cannot meet [any of the above requirements] but continue to receive finan-
cial aid on the basis of athletic ability." Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415;
INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 14.




111. INVES.IATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 20.
112. Id.
113. The "Z" test measures whether the difference between the percentage of total aid
awarded to one sex and the percentage of participants of that sex in the athletic program is
significant. INVES TGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 153.
114. The "T" test measures "whether the difference between the average [financial]
award to male and female athletes is significant." Id.
115. Id. at 19, app. D at 153-63.
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donate to the percentage of financial assistance provided to female ath-
letes, the statistical tests are employed by OCR to determine whether there
is a violation of the financial assistance compliance area. The tests are not
used to determine whether there is a difference between the awards of
financial assistance; that determination is assumed by the application of
the "Z" or "T" test. Instead, the tests are "used for determining whether
differences in the awards of athletic financial assistance to male and fe-
male athletes are significant."'
1 6
Neither the Regulations nor the Final Policy Interpretation requires a
plaintiff to use this complicated statistical analysis to demonstrate a viola-
tion of the financial assistance compliance area. Instead, a plaintiff need
merely show that the ratio of aid to participants is not substantially propor-
tionate. 17 Where, for example, women make up 34% of the athletic par-
ticipants, but receive only 28%118 of the athletic financial assistance
dollars, a court may hold, based on the 6% disparity alone, that the aid to
participants ratio is not substantially proportionate.1 19 Although statistical
analysis can serve as useful evidence in determining whether the aid to
participants ratio is substantially proportionate, the "Z" and "T" tests are
not bright-line standards a plaintiff must meet in order to state a
violation.
1 20
On the surface, schools appear to be meeting this compliance area.
In or about 1992, women athletes made up approximately one-third of the
athletes in NCAA Division I schools and received approximately one-third
of athletic scholarship dollars. 12 1 Nevertheless, women made up approxi-
mately 50% of the undergraduate populations at those schools.1 22 As will
be discussed below, this nearly 20% differential between enrollment and
female athletic participation violates the interests and abilities compliance
area stated in section 106.41(c) (1) of the Regulations. 123 It therefore de-
fies logic that section 106.37 of the Regulations would permit schools to
provide scholarships in proportion to a number of women athletes that
116. Id. at 153.
117. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
118. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 19 (sample numbers used in manual's
analysis).
119. Indeed, courts have made decisions on the "substantially proportionate" analysis re-
quired under the third compliance area discussed infra at section IV.A.3.a. See, e.g., Roberts,
814 F. Supp. at 1511-13 (10.6% disparity between female athletic participation and female
undergraduate enrollment unacceptable absent a showing of effective accommodation);
Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85 (school failed to provide opportunities to participate when
36.51% of women were involved in intercollegiate athletics while 55.61% of students enrolled
were women). Courts have made these decisions without resorting to the complicated analy-
ses proposed in the "Z" and "T" tests. Courts have, however, considered expert testimony on
whether the disparities in the proportionality are statistically significant. None have found
that statistical significance is a necessary element of a valid claim of violation of the third
compliance area. Likewise, statistical significance is not an element under the financial
assistance compliance area.
120. On discouraging bright-line standards for the substantially proportionate test of the
third compliance area, see infra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
121. Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55.
122. Id. at 54.
123. See infra part IV.A.3.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
violates section 106.41(c) (1). Thus, even where schools are fully funding
scholarships for its women athletes in proportion to their participation
rates, this will not constitute compliance with Tide IX if those participa-
tion rates are not proportionate to the enrollment rates, in violation of
section 106.41(c) (1).124
Commentators have noted this problem with the financial assistance
compliance area in their calls for reform of the Tide IX Regulations.'
25
Short of legislative reform, however, courts should follow the Investiga-
tor's Manual's caution against accepting a school's nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for disparities in financial assistance provided to female athletes.'
26
Where the athletic participation. numbers themselves are in violation of
Tide IX, those numbers cannot justify failure to provide more financial
assistance to women athletes.
127
2. Other Athletic Benefits Compliance Area
The second compliance area deals with the provision of other athletic
benefits and opportunities. Here, the Regulations set out ten criteria to
consider in determining whether the educational institution is providing
"equal athletic opportunity" to members of both sexes. 128 These criteria
are: (1) effective accommodation of interest and ability; (2) provision and
maintenance of equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games and
practice times; (4) travel and per diem expenses; (5) opportunity to re-
ceive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) assignment and compensation
of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of locker rooms, practice, and com-
petitive facilities; (8) provision of medical and training services and facili-
ties; (9) provision of housing and dining services and facilities; and (10)
publicity. 12 9 The Regulations also allow the consideration of other factors
in measuring compliance.
1 30
In addition to these ten criteria, the Final Policy Interpretation adds
two other factors useful in determining compliance under this compliance
area: recruitment of student athletes and provision of support services.'
3 '
Furthermore, the Final Policy Interpretation specifically separates the first
criterion, effective accommodation of interests and abilities, from the
other nine criteria set out in the Regulations.' 3 2 The nine remaining cri-
124. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
125. See, e.g., Heckman, supra note 11, at 63.
126. INVESTIGATOR'S MNUAL, supra note 28, at 20 (disallowing disparities in recruitment
to justify failure to provide more athletic financial assistance and scrutinizing the award of
scholarship funds based on "reasonable professional decisions" when decision negatively af-
fects athletes of one sex).
127. See Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 539.
128. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(1)-(10).
129. Id
130. Id.; see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
131. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
132. Id. at 71,415 n.3. The Final Policy Interpretation makes effective accommodation of
interests and abilities a separate compliance area. Id at 71,417. For discussion of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area, see infra part IV.A.3.
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teria plus the two added by the Final Policy Interpretation make up the
other athletic benefits compliance area.
133
The Investigator's Manual treats each of the eleven criteria of this
compliance area separately.1 3 4 Nevertheless, the criteria should be evalu-
ated together as a whole to determine whether an institution satisfies the
other athletic benefits compliance area. 135 Indeed, this compliance area
provides for an equitable weighing of each of the eleven criteria against
the others to determine whether, in totality, the institution provides equal
opportunity.' 3 6 The main focus of the other athletic benefits compliance
area is on the treatment of female athletes and whether that treatment is
equal in effect to the treatment of male athletes.'3 7 The'treatment need
not be identical; instead, an institution must provide services and benefits
which are "equal or equal in effect."
138
Title IX permits nondiscriminatory differences in the provision of ath-
letic benefits.1 39 Indeed, these differences are necessary to sustain the in-
dividual athletic teams offered by the institution. A women's soccer team,
for example, need not have the same amount of equipment as a men's
hockey team. The nature of the sport may also require a greater or lesser
degree of recruiting to fill existing positions.14 0 For example, a large foot-
ball team will often require greater recruiting than any women's teams.
Publicity, event management, and competitive facilities also may differ ac-
cording to individual teams. The Final Policy Interpretation takes into
account these team-by-team differences and directs courts and the OCR to
consider factors inherent in the basic operation of the sport including
rules of play, replacement of equipment, rates of injury, nature of facili-
ties, and others.' 4 1 Although unequal expenditures on necessary services
and benefits may be considered in evaluating a school's compliance, une-
qual aggregate expenditures alone will not constitute non-compliance
with Title IX. 14 2 As long as the differences in the provision of services and
benefits are not based on discriminatory reasons, the differences are al-
lowed and should be encouraged.
143
133. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17.
134. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 29-102.
135. See id. at 7 ("OCR will investigate all 13 program components. However, the Policy
Interpretation does permit separate investigations and findings for three major areas, specifi-
cally: 1) athletic financial assistance - § 106.37(c) 2) accommodation of athletics interests
and abilities - § 106.41(c) (1) 3) other athletic benefits and opportunities - § 106.41 (c); (this
encompasses § 106.41 (c) (2)-(10), support services and recruitment).").
136. Id.; see, e.g., Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-46.
137. See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 14.
138. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 71,415-16.
142. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
143. Some feminist scholars encourage and celebrate differences between the genders
and find the drive for identical treatment as a threat to women's rights. "Women are being
asked to settle for some pared-down version of models that men have established. Develop-
ing alternatives that are more participatory and less exploitive presents a continuing chal-
lenge. The problem, thus reformulated, is how to gain equality without relinquishing
difference." Rhode, supra note 4, at 1763 (citation omitted). Another scholar questions
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Educational institutions, however, often invoke differences between
sports to justify discriminatory disparities in treatment between men and
women athletes. 1 4 4 Indeed, female athletes still seem to find themselves
being treated as second-class, even when compared to their male counter-
parts in the identical sport. 14 5 One author noted vast disparities between
the men's and women's basketball programs at the University of Colorado
at Boulder.1 46 Specifically, the women's program received 62% of the
budget the men's basketball program received. 147 The women's basket-
ball coach's total compensation package was only 38% of the total com-
pensation package of the men's basketball coach. 1 48 Women received less
money for equipment, less than half the men's budget. 1 49 Moreover,
men's training tables, university provided meals, had a budget twenty
times greater than women's.15° Finally, the men's recruiting budget was
nearly twice the size of the .women's recruiting budget, and growing larger
each year.' 5 ' While discrepancies between single sports cannot give rise to
a claim under Title IX, 15 2 the discrepancies tend to bear out in the wo-
men's athletics programs as a whole.
155
The disparities between men's and women's athletic programs are
often rationalized by universities and colleges under a recurring theory:
revenue generation. Since men's sports, particularly football and basket-
ball, generate revenues, universities argue special treatment is justified for
whether the men's athletics program should be the standard of equality for women athletes.
Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALEJ.L.
& FEMINISM 105, 107 (1990); see also Lyn LeMaire, Women and Athletics: Toward a Physicality
Perspective, 5 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 123-27 (1982) (stating that the traditional three-step
model of athletics deters women from participating more than it does men); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIRED 122 (1987) (arguing that women should create a new
model of institutional athletics).
144. When the women's softball team sought reinstatement through informal means,
Colorado State responded that hard economic times and the public's desire to see men's
football and basketball required the university to cut other sports. In commenting on this
response to the softball players, Colorado State's Tide IX Coordinator wrote these expressed
purposes were often used to " 'justify and sustain discrimination.' " Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 5
n.4., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No. 92-Z-1310), aff'd in
part, rev'd. in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
145. See George, supra note 25, at 562; see also Rhode, supra note 5, at 1762-63 (comparing
the inadequate facilities appropriated for the women's crew, tennis, and field hockey teams
at Yale); Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55 (reporting dismal results of NCAA's gender equity
study).
146. George, supra note 25, at 557-58.
147. Id. at 560.
148. Id. at 562.
149. Id. at 563.
150. Id. (noting the university spent $30,000 on training tables for men and only $1,500
on tables for women).
151. Id. at 564.
152. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
153. See Wolff, supra note 3 (discussing the differences in benefits received by men's and
women's athletic programs); see also Wieberg, supra note 78, at ClO (noting that only 12 out




these athletes, particularly in recruiting and expenditures.1 5 4 The reve-
nue generation argument must be rejected for three reasons.
First, the argument itself is a fiction. The true financial situation of
most men's athletic teams, including football and basketball, is far from in
the black. In 1989, only 13% of the 524 Division I football programs man-
aged to cover their expenses. 15 5 Indeed, many men's programs lost far
more money than they earned, in some instances close to one million dol-
lars per year.156 Thus, men's athletic programs, like women's programs
which the institutions complain produce little or no revenue, are net ex-
penses to most institutions.
Second, and more important for purposes of legal analysis, the Final
Policy Interpretation has rejected the revenue generation argument as a
valid defense under Title IX. 1 57 Revenue producing sports are neither
exempt from nor provided special treatment under Title IX despite urg-
ing from numerous commentators to the contrary.1 58 As the authoritative
statement on Title IX from the implementing agency, the Final Policy In-
terpretation's rejection of the revenue generation argument should be fol-
lowed by courts.
Finally, allowing revenue generation as a defense fundamentally
changes the purpose of funding educational institutions with federal dol-
lars. Tax dollars are provided to these institutions not to make a profit but
to provide an education. Intercollegiate athletics departments, just like
music or theater departments or science labs, are an integral part of the
education experience and should not be converted to mini pro-sports
franchises. Otherwise, Congress and the Internal Revenue Service may
very well resolve to tax those universities that treat athletic programs as a
means of generating profit rather than a means of providing and supple-
menting a federally funded education.
159
No court has directly addressed the revenue generation argument
under Title IX. 6° When presented with the argument, however, courts
should reject it. Sports offered by federally funded educational institu-
tions should complement the educational process, not supersede it. Like
154. See Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (9th Cir. 1994) (accepting
the revenue generation argument under the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also George, supra
note 25, at 567-70 (mentioning the "market demands" analysis for why women's coaches are
paid substantially less than men's coaches); Wolff, supra note 3, at 55 (discussing traditional
argument that men's teams, which produce revenue, should be excluded from gender equity
concerns).
155. Wolff, supra note 3, at 55.
156. Id. (stating that the University of Colorado's football program lost more than
$800,000 in 1990, the year it shared the national championship with Georgia Tech); see also
George, supra note 25, at 567 (noting that the University of Colorado men's basketball pro-
gram lost over $400,000 in 1992).
157. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,421.
158. Id.
159. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 64 (noting some congressmen, the IRS, and the Federal
Trade Commission have considered taxing intercollegiate athletics); see also George, supra
note 25, at 568-69 (rejecting revenue generation argument and stressing importance of the
educational aspects of athletics as opposed to financial profitability).
160. Cf. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320-21 (accepting revenue generation defense under Fair
Labor Standards Act).
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the Favia court, future courts should focus on the educational benefits of
interscholastic and intercollegiate competition: the development of self-
confidence, physical and mental well-being, and the feeling of team cohe-
sion and accomplishment. 16 1 Simply because an all-male sport may bring
a school additional revenue, prestige, or alumni contribution cannot jus-
tify the denial of the educational benefits of athletics to women. Title IX
mandates that no person shall be denied benefits of any educational pro-
gram on the basis of sex. 162 Allowing schools to buy exemption from Title
IX for individual male teams makes a mockery of the plain language of
Title IX.
To analyze properly compliance with Title IX under the other athlet-
ics benefits compliance area, courts must review differences and/or dis-
parities under the criteria set out in the Final Policy Interpretation and the
Investigator's Manual without reference to revenue generation. In Cook v.
Colgate University, the district court performed this analysis and found Col-
gate in violation of this compliance area. 163 The women's hockey team
was provided far fewer benefits than the men's hockey team and, on that
basis, the district court found a violation.
16 4
Interestingly, the Cook court directly compared men's hockey to wo-
men's hockey and did not evaluate the athletic programs as a whole.165
Where the teams are identical, arguably there are no sport differences
which justify different treatment. 166 Thus, one could argue, when an edu-
cational institution sponsors separate programs for members of each sex
in the same sport, courts may apply the team-to-team analysis to determine
whether a school meets the requirements of this compliance area. If an
institution maintains men's and women's basketball teams, for example,
the women's basketball team need only prove a disparity between the
treatment of its team and the treatment of the men's basketball team.
Although the team-to-team approach may seem compelling at first,
the approach may end up doing more harm than good to women's sports
by needlessly hampering an educational institution's choice to foster a
particular team or teams. The team-to-team approach forces educational
institutions to focus their equal treatment efforts on women's teams which
have an identical male counterpart at the institution. Thus, women's bas-
ketball and soccer may get elevated in treatment, while women's field
hockey or gymnastics get overlooked. Yet, women's teams with male coun-
161. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583.
162. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
163. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-45.
164. Id. at 745. In Cook, the court stated, "[t]he men's ice hockey players at Colgate are
treated like princes. The women ice hockey players are treated like chimney sweeps." Id.
165. See id. at 744-45. Plaintiffs provided examples in six areas where they contended
Colgate discriminated against them, including expenditures, travel, equipment, locker
rooms, practice times, and coaching. Id.
166. Differences in crowds drawn by either team may support different treatment for
event management and security. Nevertheless, no team differences justify disparate treat-
ment with regard to equipment, travel, lockers, team practice, etc. See Final Policy Interpreta-
tion, supra note 2, at 71,416.
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terparts may not be teams the institution or the bulk of its student body
wishes to foster.
For example, an educational institution may choose to operate and
foster a women's gymnastic team (which has no male counterpart) while,
at the same time, offering women's and men's basketball. Given the his-
torical success of the gymnastics team accompanied by the relatively high
cost of maintaining the sport, the educational institution may choose to
devote more funding to maintain the regional or national success of that
team rather than divert funds to women's basketball. The school may wish
to provide greater recruiting efforts and coaching to women's gymnastics
to continue as a "power house" in that particular sport. Moreover, female
students may wish to continue the focus on the gymnastics team as demon-
strated by the number of interested gymnasts, attendance at meets, and
the like.
On the other hand, if women's basketball is less successful and histori-
cally has gained less recognition from the institution and its students, the
institution should be free to choose to foster the gymnastics team over the
women's basketball team. This is true even where men's basketball may be
the institution's "power house" counterpart to women's gymnastics. Sim-
ply because a school chooses to foster men's basketball over men's hockey
or football should not require the school to equally prioritize the women's
side of the athletics program.
Nothing in Title IX prevents schools from fostering certain athletic
teams; Title IX merely prevents them from providing unequal treatment
between the sexes. The team-to-team analysis gives an educational institu-
tion the limited option of downsizing the successful men's basketball
team, or upgrading the less successful women's basketball team, by taking
funds from other teams such as the women's gymnastics team. Under a
program-to-program analysis, however, schools need not downgrade suc-
cessful teams to upgrade less successful women's teams simply because
there is a male counterpart team at the institution. As long as the institu-
tion is providing benefits to women that are equal, or equal in effect, to
the men's athletic program as a whole, a disparity between a single wo-
men's athletic team and its male counterpart should not violate this com-
pliance area. Equality should be measured by opportunities and benefits
to the group as a whole, not the individual or team.
167
To state a valid claim under Title IX, athletes must present prima
facie evidence that the entire women's program receives unequal treat-
ment in the criteria listed above. 16a In practice, women will be able to
present prima facie evidence since most educational institutions are not
providing women's programs equal benefits. The Final Policy Interpreta-
167. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title IX,
88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1265 (1979) (discussing why a selection of separate teams for men and
women is necessary).
168. See generally Wolff, supra note 3 (stating that women's sports receive less money for
scholarships and programs overall). Moreover, individual teams can request specific treat-
ment even though the violation goes to the program as a whole. See infra notes 275-89 and
accompanying text.
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tion and Investigator's Manual provide detailed guidance to courts in eval-
uating the criteria in which a plaintiff has alleged a violation. 169
Differences in a single criterion will not necessarily result in a violation of
the compliance area. Only where the single difference is substantial, such
as wholesale failure to recruit for women's sports, will a single difference
result in a disparity or violation. 170 Otherwise, the Final Policy Interpreta-
tion and the Investigator's Manual essentially use a "totality of circum-
stances" approach to assess an institution's compliance. 171 This approach
is appropriate because, unlike the other compliance areas, the other ath-
letic benefits compliance area requires evaluation of eleven different crite-
ria. Furthermore, this totality of circumstances evaluation allows courts to
balance shortfalls in one criterion against adequate services and benefits
in other areas.
172
The totality of circumstances approach is a workable solution to con-
serving scarce educational resources. This approach allows an institution
to balance the relatively minor provision of equipment to the women's
soccer team with other provisions like higher recruiting or newer uniforms
in women's soccer or more equipment in women's gymnastics. Moreover,
when applied on a program-to-program basis, the totality approach allows
an educational institution to retain flexibility in choosing which sports it
chooses to foster. The goal behind this compliance area is to look for
overall balance and an attempt to spread scarce resources equally, not
identically, between the sexes. A totality of circumstances approach helps
achieve that goal.
3. Interests and Abilities Compliance Area
The third and final compliance area is the effective accommodation
of athletic interests and abilities (interests and abilities compliance area).
The Regulations require educational institutions to ensure their "selection
of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests
and abilities of members of both sexes."' 73 Although the Regulations
combine this compliance area with nine other criteria, the Final Policy
Interpretation, Investigator's Manual, and case law make clear this crite-
rion is to be assessed as a wholly separate compliance area. 174 Failure to
provide full and effective accommodation of women's athletic interests
and abilities can create a separate and distinct violation of Title IX.
i 7 5
169. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17; INvESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 29-96.
170. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
171. Id. at 71,417; see also INVESnIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7-8.
172. See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 8.
173. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(1).
174. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,417; INVEsTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 7, 21; see, e.g., Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1510-11.
175. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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The interests and abilities compliance area is the cornerstone of Title
IX as it applies to athletics. 176 "There is little question that this factor [of
effective accommodation of interests and abilities] is the most important
criteria listed in section 106.41(c)." 177 Without this compliance area, the
other compliance areas would be of little meaning. A simple example
demonstrates the point. Assume an educational institution has 48% men
and 52% women in its undergraduate population. The educational insti-
tution's athletic program, however, is 70% male and 30% female. Assume
further the female athletes each receive 100% scholarship (while their
male counterparts receive a range of 0% to 100% scholarships). The fe-
male athletes also have brand new showers, brand new equipment, and
first class travel. Under the analyses above, the educational institution is in
full compliance with the financial assistance and other athletic benefits
compliance areas. Nevertheless, the educational institution will probably
not comply with the interests and abilities compliance area, as discussed
below.1 78 Without the interests and abilities compliance area, upon which
the other two compliance areas depend, educational institutions can feign
gender equity by treating a few individual female athletes on a level equal
to or better than the male athletes. Indeed, educational institutions would
find it far less troublesome and less expensive to treat a single individual,
or small group of individuals, as "equals" than to bring true gender equity
to an entire athletic department.'
79
The Final Policy Interpretation states, "it is the achievement of 'equal
opportunity' for which recipients are responsible and to which the final
Policy Interpretation is addressed."18 0 The goal behind Title IX and the
Final Policy Interpretation is to see that educational institutions provide
equal athletic opportunities to women as an entire group, not just a few
select individuals hand-picked by educational institutions. 18 1 It would de-
feat the purpose of Title IX to allow institutions to doctor the symptoms of
176. The interests and abilities compliance area delineates the "heartland" of Title IX.
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897; see also Heckman, supra note 11, at 45 (stating that the interests and
abilities factor is the most significant of the 10 criteria).
177. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 989.
178. At these enrollment participation number ratios (a 22% point differential), the edu-
cational institution unquestionably fails the "substantially proportionate" prong of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area. See infra part IV.A.3.a. For purposes of this example, it is
assumed the educational institution cannot show a history and continuing practice of pro-
gram expansion or full accommodation of interests and abilities as these requirements are
discussed below. See infra parts IV.A.3.b, IV.A.3.c. Courts, however, should not find a viola-
tion of Title IX based solely on lack of substantial proportionality between female athletic
participation rates and female undergraduate enrollment. Instead, courts must also look to
the other two prongs of the interests and abilities compliance area to determine whether
there is unlawful discrimination. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895.
179. "Satisfaction of [the compliance area] factor is the only means by which greater
athletic opportunities for women and girls may be established. If women are afforded
greater athletic opportunities, by necessity more equipment, supplies, facilities, scheduling,
coaches, and scholarships will be required to insure equal athletic opportunity." Heckman,
supra note 11, at 45.
180. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,414.
181. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897. "[A]n institution that offers women a smaller number of
athletic opportunities than the statute requires may not rectify that violation simply by lavish-
ing more resources on those women or achieving equivalence in other respects." Id.
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discrimination-less money and fewer benefits for women's sports-with-
out combating the source of the discrimination: lack of equal opportunity
to participate in athletics. Accordingly, this compliance area should be of
primary concern to the courts. Only where the playing field is level
through equal athletic opportunity can courts effectively evaluate compli-
ance in the other two compliance areas.
The Final Policy Interpretation divides assessment of the interests and
abilities compliance area into three categories: (1) "the determination of
athletic interests and abilities of students;" (2) "the selection of sports of-
fered;" and (3) "the levels of competition available including the opportu-
nity for team competition."1 8 2 Determination of interests and abilities183
and selection of sports, 184 while important, are secondary to the levels of
competition category; the Investigator's Manual includes the two former
categories in its discussion of the levels of competition category. 18 5
The levels of competition category of the interests and abilities com-
pliance area is intended to assess whether the institution provides overall
equal opportunities to men and women to participate and compete in ath-
letics. Institutions must provide equal opportunities to participate (called
opportunities to compete) and equal levels of team competition (called
competitive team schedules). 186 Competitive team schedules refers pri-
marily to the level of play at which the athletes compete.187
The opportunity to compete subcategory is the real focus of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area and has been the focus of the recent
Title IX litigation in athletics. This subcategory addresses the question
whether women and men are afforded the same athletic opportunities.1 88
182. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,417. A schematic diagram of Title IX
is set out in the Appendix to this article.
183. The determination of interests and abilities discusses the manner in which an educa-
tional institution may assess the athletic interests and abilities of its underrepresented sex. Id.
The institution may choose any method of assessing interests and abilities, including surveys
or sections within the enrollment application, so long as the method, among other things,
does not discriminate against the underrepresented sex. Id.
184. The selection of sports category discusses the institution's responsibilities when it
offers a sport for one gender that it does not offer for the other and distinctions are made for
contact and non-contact sports. Id. at 71,417-18. For an analysis of this category, see
Heckman, supra note 11, at 45-62.
185. Determining interests and abilities is discussed under the third prong of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area's competitive opportunities test set out below. See INVESm-
GATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 25. Selection of sports is discussed in the "Cautions"
section of the interests and abilities compliance area. Id. at 26-27. The Investigator's Manual
indicates that a survey or assessment of interests and abilities is not required by the Tide IX
regulations or the Final Policy Interpretation. Id. at 27.
186. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418. A violation of either the oppor-
tunity to compete or competitive team schedules subcategories gives rise to separate viola-
tions of Title IX. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 990-91. A violation occurs when requirements of one
or the other, or both subcategories are not met. Id. at 991.
187. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; see also INVESTIGATOR'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 28, at 21 (noting "levels of competition" refers to the quality of competition
indicated by whether a team competes against other teams at the same division level).




To determine whether an educational institution affords equal opportuni-
ties, courts must apply a three-pronged test:' 8 9
(1) Whether the intercollegiate or interscholastic participation
opportunities for male and female students are substantially pro-
portionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among athletes, whether the institution can show a history and
continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably
responsive to the developing interests and abilities of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion, whether it can be demonstrated
that the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated. 190
This section of the article analyzes these three prongs and discusses
how the federal courts have applied, and should apply, the test.
a. Substantially Proportionate
Recent Title IX litigation has repeatedly addressed the definition and
breadth of the "substantially proportionate" prong of the interests and
abilities compliance area.1 9 ' The Final Policy Interpretation does not de-
fine the term "substantially proportionate," 192 and the Investigator's Man-
ual provides no additional assistance: "There is no set ratio that constitutes
'substantially proportionate' or that, when not met, results in a disparity or
a violation. All factors for this program component [interests and abili-
ties] and any justifications for differences offered by the institution, must
be considered before a finding is made."193 How, then, do courts deter-
mine whether an institution's athletic participation rates are "substantially
proportionate" to its undergraduate enrollment rates? Recent cases pro-
vide some guidance.
In Roberts v. Colorado State University, the district court held a 10.5%
differential between women's enrollment and women's athletic participa-
tion was not in compliance with the "substantially proportionate" require-
ment of the first prong. 194 The Roberts district and circuit courts further
agreed that the OCR had found Colorado State in noncompliance with
this prong when its differential had been 7.5%, 12.5%, and 12.7%.1 9 5 In
Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, the district court found a 17.84%
differential not substantially proportionate. 19 6 Moreover, in Cohen v.
Brown University, the district court found an 11.6% differential not substan-
189. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418.
190. Id.
191. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1511-13;Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Cohen, 809 F. Supp.
at 991.
192. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418.
193. INVESnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 24.
194. 814 F. Supp. at 1512-13. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this finding.
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-30.
195. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513.
196. 812 F. Supp. at 584-85.
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tially proportionate. 19 7 The smallest differential recognized by a court as
violating the substantially proportionate prong was the 7.5% differential
noted by the Roberts courts where the OCR found Colorado State in non-
compliance.19 8 Nevertheless, none of these cases provided a method for
other courts to analyze the "substantially proportionate" standard in the
future.199
In developing a workable application of the "substantially proportion-
ate" standard, courts must understand the purpose for using this appar-
ently amorphous benchmark. Neither the Final Policy Interpretation nor
the Investigator's Manual attempts to set a rigid, bright-line standard that
distinguishes compliance from noncompliance. To do so would require
an athletic institution to add or subtract individual athletes every year as
undergraduate enrollment rates fluctuated within normal matriculation
parameters or recruitment efforts. A rigid rule would be unable to take
into account an unexpected dearth in male enrollment or the equally un-
expected decision of a top female athlete to accept a scholarship from
another school. Accordingly, the Final Policy Interpretation and the In-
vestigator's Manual require "substantial proportionality," a standard which
ideally aims to keep the enrollment rates and participation rates in exact
proportion,2 0 0 but which can accommodate year-to-year fluctuations in the
enrollment and athletic participation. Courts should not undermine this
purpose by imposing a bright-line standard for compliance.
In practice, educational institutions have used bright-line standards
under the "substantially proportionate" analysis to justify continued dis-
crimination.20 1 To those educational institutions, "substantially propor-
tionate" has become a glass ceiling with which they attempt to justify their
deliberate limitation of athletic opportunities for women. Around the
country, institutions have come to set their sights on the 40% female ath-
letic participation demarcation. For example, the Big Ten Athletic Con-
ference set the 40% participation mark as a requirement for its
institutional members.20 2 While this is a step in the right direction, since
few schools are anywhere near the 40% mark, the Big Ten's arbitrary selec-
tion of 40% female athletic participation rate actually continues discrimi-
nation and ensures women will remain second class athletes.203
Institutional members of the Big Ten will strive for this 40% demarcation
regardless of their female undergraduate enrollment. An institution with
197. 809 F. Supp. at 991.
198. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513.
199. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 (stating the Tenth Circuit would not further demar-
cate the line between substantial proportionality and disproportionality other than to agree a
10.5% differential was not substantially proportionate).
200. "[I]f the enrollment is 52% male and 48% female, then, ideally, about 52% of the
participants in the athletics program should be male and 48% female...." INVESTIGATOR'S
MANuAL, supra note 28, at 24.
201. SeeKelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 240 (C.D. Ill. 1993).
202. See id.
203. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55; see also Wieberg, supra note 78 (noting that only 12




40% female undergraduate enrollment and one with 55% undergraduate
enrollment each strive for the same goal of 40% women athletic participa-
tion. Instead of reaching for "substantial proportionality," the educational
institutions reach for the arbitrarily determined and, in many cases, inex-
plicably low standard of 40% female athletic participation.
20 4
The "substantially proportionate" prong should not be applied to cre-
ate a glass ceiling through which female athletes will never pass, nor one at
which educational institutions will be found in compliance even though
their female enrollment rates are substantially higher than an arbitrarily
determined participation rate. To ensure true equality between the sexes,
this prong must not be applied like a pre-set quota as urged by some edu-
cational institutions. 20 5 Instead, the method of analyzing "substantial pro-
portionality" must reflect the purpose of the standard to bring about near-
exact parity while allowing for year-to-year fluctuations.
In future Title IX athletics litigation, the "substantially proportionate"
prong should be applied by using evidentiary presumptions. Under this
method of analysis, plaintiffs have the initial burden of proving the rates of
undergraduate enrollment and athletic participation are not exactly pro-
portionate. Plaintiffs could meet this burden by producing evidence of
the number of female undergraduate enrollees as compared with the
number of female athletes. Once disproportionality is established, a re-
buttable evidentiary presumption should operate in the plaintiffs' favor
that the participation rates are not "substantially proportionate" within the
meaning of the Final Policy Interpretation.
20 6
If the educational institution chooses to challenge the "substantially
proportionate" prong of the interests and abilities compliance area, it may
produce evidence to rebut the presumption now operating in plaintiffs'
favor. To rebut the presumption, the educational institution need merely
produce evidence that the disparity between the enrollment rates and par-
ticipation rates are due to enrollment fluctuations or unexpected transfers
of student athletes. Under this analysis, however, an educational institu-
tion cannot claim compliance with this prong by demonstrating its differ-
ential has always been less than 10% year after year. To allow such
evidence to justify participation-enrollment rate disparities would only
promote the glass ceiling defense discussed above. If a court determined
that any differential below 7% is substantially proportionate, educational
institutions will strive to hit the 7% differential and nothing more.
Schools will have no greater incentive to raise women's athletic participa-
tion higher than the number arbitrarily determined by the courts and will
continue to provide proportionately more athletic opportunities to men
204. The Big Ten's ultimate goal of 60/40 male to female participation ratio does not
preempt compliance with Title IX's requirements of equal opportunity for male and female
athletes because a school's "actions must be measured by Title IX's requirements." Kelley,
832 F. Supp. at 242 n.5. "The obligation to comply with [Title IX] is not obviated or allevi-
ated by any rule or regulation of any. . . athletic or other league, or association .... " 34
C.F.R § 106.6(c); see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422.
205. See Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240.
206. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
simply because the schools have historically chosen to do so and prefer to
continue on that course. Schools will never treat women as equals in ath-
letics; rather, women will always get only as much as the courts require the
schools to give.
True nondiscriminatory fluctuations may only be proven by demon-
strating unexpected increases or decreases in matriculation for a certain
gender, changes in participation rates due to the graduation of a large
number of senior athletes, or similar'fluctuations. Unless proof of these
nondiscriminatory reasons for differences between the enrollment rates
and athletic participation rates can be found, educational institutions
should be unable to rebut the evidentiary presumption that athletic op-
portunities are not substantially proportionate.
If, however, an educational institution produces evidence of nondis-
criminatory reasons such as unexpected matriculation fluctuations, plain-
tiffs carry the ultimate burden of proving the participation rates are not
substantially proportionate to enrollment rates.20 7 Plaintiffs may present
statistical evidence that demonstrates the differences between the enroll-
ment and participation rates are statistically significant and demonstrate a
persistent pattern over a period of time. Statistical evidence is useful to
demonstrate that disparities between enrollment and participation rates
are not the result of mere chance or year-to-year fluctuations. Plaintiffs
may also introduce evidence that demonstrates women's participation
rates have never exceeded their enrollment rates.2 08 Arguably, true year-
to-year fluctuations would cause the female participation rates to some-
times exceed female enrollment rates. Plaintiffs may argue that the educa-
tional institution's assertion of nondiscriminatory factors are unjustified,
fabricated, or overstated. Of course, the ultimate burden lies with plain-
tiffs to persuade the trier of fact that the enrollment-participation rates are
not substantially proportionate.
20 9
The use of presumptions is a fair and reasonable way to apply the
"substantially proportionate" prong. The purpose of Title IX is to make
athletic opportunities equal It is therefore logical to presume that where
the participation rates are not equal to the enrollment rates, the educa-
tional institution is unfairly favoring one gender. The presumption is eas-
ily overcome where the institution shows the differential is not a result of
unfair favoritism, but a result of unanticipated changes in enrollment or
athletic participation. Furthermore, educational institutions are protected
from undue hardship by the fact that plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden
207. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on the substantially proportionate prong of the
interests and abilities compliance area. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829 n.5; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at
584.
208. No co-educational post-secondary institution reported in a 1992 USA Today study has
female participation rates which exceed female enrollment rates. Wieberg, supra note 78, at
CIO. This demonstrates that educational institutions are not prevented from "substantially
proportionate" rates by virtue of mere fluctuations. Instead, schools have made conscious
choices to continue to promote their men's athletics programs at the expense of their wo-
men's programs.
209. See supra note 207.
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of proof on this prong,2 10 and defendants may still find safe harbor in the
two additional prongs of this compliance area: showing a history and con-
tinuing practice of program expansion and full and effective accommoda-
tion of the interests and abilities.
2 11
The Investigator's Manual supports this evidentiary presumptions ap-
proach, noting that the ideal result is exact parity between enrollment
rates and athletic participation rates.21 2 Thus, exact parity is the logical
starting place for analyzing whether an institution meets the "substantially
proportionate" prong. Nevertheless, the Investigator's Manual directs the
OCR to consider "any justifications for differences offered by the institu-
tion" before making a finding under this prong.21 3 If a plaintiff can
demonstrate, however, that the asserted 'justifications" are less than genu-
ine or are also discriminatory, the justifications should not be used to vali-
date discrimination.
The desired effect of this evidentiary presumption approach is to stop
the existing search for the magical number at which an educational insti-
tution will be in compliance with this prong. There should be no pre-set
athletic participation number (such as 40%) or set differential between
enrollment and athletic participation (such as 10% or less) that establishes
compliance. Instead, the courts should focus on the manner in which an
institution allocates its limited athletic opportunities to men and women.
The manner of distribution of athletic opportunities and whether the dis-
tribution is a result of an existing preference for male sports underlies the
evidentiary presumption approach. Whether an educational institution
complies with this first prong will always remain a question for the trier of
fact. The presumption, however, will ensure that plaintiffs may effectively
challenge an educational institution's practice of keeping female athletes
close but never quite equal. Courts also must bear in mind that a violation
of this first prong does not end the inquiry under the interests and abili-
ties compliance area.
b. History and Continuing Practice of Program Expansion
Where an institution's enrollment rates are not "substantially propor-
tionate" to its athletic participation rates, the analysis moves to the second
prong: whether an educational institution can show a "history and contin-
uing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to
the developing interest and abilities of the members of [the under-
represented] sex."2 14 This second prong of the opportunity to compete
analysis allows educational institutions to come into compliance with Title
IX by demonstrating continued progress toward gender equity in their
athletic departments. Where, for example, an institution became co-edu-
210. See supra note 207.
211. See discussion infra parts IVA.3.b., IV.A.3.c.
212. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 24.
213. I&
214. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; INVESTnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 21.
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cational within the last decade, the institution's gradual, but continuous,
expansion of the newly-admitted gender's athletic opportunities satisfies
this prong. Thus, the educational institutions are given the opportunity to
reach gender equity at a reasonable pace and are not required to achieve
full equality overnight.
Like the "substantially proportionate" prong, however, this prong has
been used by long-time co-educational institutions to feign compliance
with Title IX.2 15 When Congress passed Title IX in 1972, many post-sec-
ondary educational institutions offered no athletic opportunities to their
female students. Since that time, institutions have expanded women's
sports in reaction to Title IX's passage. For example, Colorado State of-
fered no women's sports prior to 1970 and added eleven women's sports
during the 1970s in reaction to the mandates of Title IX.2 16 Thus, Colo-
rado State expanded its program from 0% female athletic participation in
the pre-1970 period to approximately 37.7% female athletic participation
in the 1992-93 athletic year.2 1 7 Allowing an educational institution to
claim it has a history and continuing practice of program expansion sim-
ply because it added sports in the 1970s, however, undermines Title IX's
purpose and renders the interests and abilities compliance area meaning-
less. As Judge Weinshienk succinctly stated in Roberts, "[a]cceptance of
this argument also would implicitly condone the attitude that female ath-
letes.., should be satisfied with their current opportunities given the pre-
1970 lack of participation opportunities for women in intercollegiate ath-
letics." 21 8 The history of expansion prong was never intended to allow
educational institutions to get off scot-free for present discrimination sim-
ply because they can demonstrate they added a few women's teams within
the last twenty years.
In analyzing history of program expansion, courts should focus on the
"continuing practice" language of this prong, since addition of teams at
the inception of women's athletics cannot provide a defense under Title
IX.2 19 The district court in Roberts suggested the relevant period for deter-
mining program expansion is the era in which Colorado State was put on
notice by the OCR that its participation rates were not substantially pro-
portionate to its enrollment rates. 220 This analysis, although relevant for
Colorado State, should not be applied as a standard. Some institutions
may not have the record of OCR investigations that Colorado State has.
22 1
Furthermore, notice to an educational institution is not an element of a
215. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1514.
216. Defendants in Roberts used as a defense to plaintiffs' Title IX claim the fact that CSU
added 11 women's sports in the 1970s. Id.
217. I. at 1512, 1514.
218. Id at 1514.
219. It is important to note that a court would have to look at the entire history of the
women's athletic program if the institution had only recently begun accepting women into its
undergraduate enrollment and providing women athletic opportunities.
220. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1515.




violation of this compliance area. 222 Courts should not limit their inquiry
of program expansion to a period wherein the school was put on notice of
its potential Title IX violation. The sole inquiry under this prong should
focus on whether the educational institutions can demonstrate a continu-
ing practice of program expansion that responds to the developing athletic
interests of women.
223
In evaluating the history and continuing practice of program expan-
sion, courts also must look at the number of women's athletic teams
recently added and the increase in number of participation opportuni-
ties.22 4 If the institution shows a continuing practice of program expan-
sion for the underrepresented gender, the educational institution will be
found in compliance with this prong, and the interests and abilities com-
pliance area analysis ends.
225
Faced with economic cuts, however, most schools have been con-
tracting athletic programs for both men and women. Contraction of both
sexes' athletic programs, with a smaller contraction of women's programs,
cannot satisfy this second prong. The "expansion by contraction" argu-
ment was raised by Colorado State in the Roberts case, to no avail. Colo-
rado State claimed that since it had increased its participation numbers by
virtue of contracting its women's and men's athletic programs (eliminat-
ing 18 softball players and 55 baseball players), it showed a history of pro-
gram expansion. 2 26 The Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected this argument.
We recognize that in times of economic hardship, few schools
will be able to satisfy Title IX's effective accommodation require-
ment by continuing to expand their women's athletics programs.
Nonetheless, the ordinary meaning of the word "expansion" may
not be twisted to find compliance under this prong when schools
have increased the relative percentages of women participating
in athletics by making cuts in both men's and women's sports
programs. Financially strapped institutions may still comply with
Title IX by cutting athletic programs such that men's and wo-
men's athletic participation rates become substantially propor-
tionate to their representation in the undergraduate
population.
227
The burden of proof for program expansion is placed on the educational
institution.
2 28
222. Although Congress directed that an educational institution must be notified of its
violation before federal funds are withdrawn, Congress, the Regulations and the Final Policy
Interpretation never directed that a plaintiff must prove an educational institution was on
notice in order to prove a violation. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
223. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; INvESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 21.
224. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1514; INVESTIGATOR'S MANtUAL, supra note 28, at 24-25.
225. See INVESnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 25.
226. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1514.
227. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
228. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418 (stating the necessary inquiry
as "[w]hether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expan-
sion") (emphasis added); INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 21 (same); Roberts, 998
F.2d at 830 n.8 (noting that the language of Policy Interpretation places burden of proof on
the institution).
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c. Full and Effective Accommodation of Interests and Abilities
When athletic participation and undergraduate enrollments are not
substantially proportionate and where the institution cannot show a his-
tory and continuing practice of program expansion, the courts must ana-
lyze the third and final prong of the interests and abilities compliance
area's opportunity to compete test: "whether it can be demonstrated that
the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program."
229
This prong allows institutions to provide greater athletic opportuni-
ties to one gender where the other gender simply does not wish or is not
able to compete. For example, a community college which primarily
serves older, part-time students may meet this prong. The school may of-
fer no scholarships or intercollegiate athletics. It may, however, offer in-
tramural athletics for its students. The school may demonstrate that it has
no (or very few) female participants because women have shown no inter-
est in competing in the intramural program (because of jobs, parenting,
etc.). In this instance, the institution would satisfy the third prong and
would not be in violation of the interests and abilities compliance area.
To evaluate this prong, courts must consider a number of factors: any
surveys conducted by the institution demonstrating athletic interest or
ability in the underrepresented gender; "expressed interests" of the under-
represented gender; club and intramural participation by the under-
represented gender; and, participation levels in feeder schools,
community programs, or physical education classes. 230 Moreover, the
manner in which the educational institution met the developing interests
of men, and whether the institution actively encouraged any male sport,
also must be considered.23 1 If an institution has cut an existing and viable
women's team, this prong will be easily satisfied by testimony by the plain-
tiff athletes regarding their interests and abilities in continuing play on
their former team.
232
Educational institutions have argued that they need accommodate
women only to the extent they accommodate men. Thus, the argument
goes, if male interest in baseball is unmet, the school may ignore women's
interest in softball.2 33 The First and Tenth Circuits have specifically re-
jected this argument.
2 34
Even if unmet interests and abilities are demonstrated by the under-
represented gender, an institution need not upgrade or create a new sport
229. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 21.
230. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 25.
231. Id.
232. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831-32.
233. Id. at 831.
234. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 ("[T]his benchmark sets a high standard: it demands
not merely some accommodation, but full and effective accommodation. If there is sufficient
interest and ability among members of the statistically underrepresented gender, not slaked




where there is no reasonable expectation of competition for that sport
within the institution's normal competitive region. 23 5 If, for example, a
sufficient number of women at the University of Florida wish to institute a
cross-country ski team, the institution need not accommodate that interest
if cross-country skiing is not a sport available within the University of Flor-
ida's normal competitive region. Institutions, however, may be required
to actively encourage the development of such opportunities within the
competitive region where overall athletic opportunities have been histori-
cally limited for the members of one sex.23 6 So, for example, the entire
Pac Ten Conference could not decide to drop all women's volleyball, thus
providing themselves the excuse that there is no opportunity for women's
competition within the Pac Ten competitive region. Moreover, the histori-
cal discriminating practices of a group of educational institutions is not a
sufficient reason to justify and continue discrimination. Otherwise, the
old boys' network would have little incentive to change.
Plaintiffs carry the burden of proof for the third prong of the interests
and abilities compliance area.23 7 Although some district courts have held
otherwise, circuit courts have held the burden is on plaintiffs since proof
of disproportionality alone will not state a claim under Title IX. 238 Thus,
plaintiffs state a prima facie claim under the interests and abilities compli-
ance area by alleging and proving (1) the rates of female undergraduate
enrollment and the rates of female athletic participation are not substan-
tially proportionate, and (2) there are unmet athletic interests and abili-
ties in women attending the educational institution. A defendant
institution can avoid liability under this compliance area by proving a his-
tory and continuing practice of athletic program expansion for the under-
represented gender.
2 39
4. Discriminatory Intent: Not a Required Element
To state a claim under Title IX, a plaintiff need not prove discrimina-
tory intent.240 In construing Title VI, the statute on which Title IX was
modeled,2 4 1 a majority of the Supreme Court held that a violation of the
235. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831; see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418;
INVES CGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 27.
236. See Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 746-47 (rejecting as defenses defendant's claims that wo-
men's ice hockey was not sponsored by NCAA, that region had insufficient competition, and
that high school women's ice hockey provided inadequate recruitment base for Colgate to
develop a women's team).
237. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831 (stating an institution would be hard pressed to
prove full and effective accommodation in the abstract).
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 214-28 and accompanying text.
240. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539-40 (1987).
241. Title IX was patterned after Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat.
252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988)), and should be construed similarly. Grove City,
465 U.S. at 566; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694. Some courts have held, however, that Title VII, not
Title VI, is "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards,
including the question of whether 'disparate impact' is sufficient to establish discrimination
under Title IX." Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832-33 (quoting Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Col-
leges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849
(1987)).
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statute requires proof of discriminatory intent.242 Nevertheless, a different
majority agreed proof of discriminatory effect was all that was required to
state a claim under Title VI's implementing regulations.243 The first court to
reach this issue in Title IX litigation followed this Title VI analysis and
ruled the plaintiffs did not need to prove discriminatory intent on their
Title IX claim because they had alleged a violation of the statute and the
Regulations.2 44 Moreover, the recent athletics cases also hold discrimina-
tory intent is not required to state a claim under Title IX.245 Proof of
intent, however, may have an impact on the remedies available to a plain-
tiff, as discussed below.
2 46
B. Affirmative Defenses to a Title IX Athletics Case
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of violation under one
of the three compliance areas, the burden shifts to the defendant educa-
tional institution to establish affirmative defenses. This section discusses
what legitimate defenses allow an educational institution to maintain an
athletic program that violates one of the three compliance areas.
Nondiscriminatory reasons may be used to justify overall disparities in
all compliance areas except the interests and abilities compliance area.
2 4 7
In the interests and abilities compliance area, the only defense for a prima
facie violation is proof of a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for the underrepresented gender.
248
242. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983); see also Haffer, 678
F. Supp. at 539.
243. Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2.
244. Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 539-40 (stating Title IX regulations do not explicitly impose
an intent requirement).
245. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832-33; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1518; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at
584.
246. See discussion infra part V.B.
247. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415. The financial assistance com-
pliance area states: "[ii nstitutions may be found in compliance if... a resulting disparity can
be explained by adjustments to take into account legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors," and
the other athletic benefits compliance area states: "a finding of compliance may still be justi-
fied if the differences are the result of nondiscriminatory factors." Id.
248. Id. at 71,418 (setting out a three-pronged test for this compliance area, making the
second prong (whether institutions can show history and continuing practice of program
expansion) a defense to the failure to provide athletic opportunities substantially proportion-
ate to enrollment rates when interests are not fully and effectively accommodated). The
interests and abilities compliance area is the only compliance area in which courts are not
allowed to consider legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons in assessing compliance.
The Investigator's Manual appears to contradict the Final Policy Interpretation on this
issue by directing the OCR to consider nondiscriminatory reasons for disparities in all com-
pliance areas. INVESrIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 3-4. Nevertheless, a closer reading
of the Investigator's Manual demonstrates support for the proposition that the only defense
to a violation of the interests and abilities compliance area is the second prong in that three-
pronged test; the Investigator's Manual makes no mention of nondiscriminatoryjustifications
that may serve as defenses. See id. at 24-27. Instead, the Manual discusses justifications for
differences in determining whether the rates are substantially proportionate, the first prong
of the test. For a discussion of this first prong, see supra part IVA.3.a. (concerning burden
shifting presumptions in establishing whether participation and enrollment rates are substan-
tially proportionate). Nondiscriminatory year-to-year fluctuations are not affirmative de-
fenses to a violation of the overall compliance area, but are evidence to consider in
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As for affirmative defenses in the other two compliance areas, the Fi-
nal Policy Interpretation and Investigator's Manual make repeated refer-
ences to the use of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons by an institution
to justify a disparity in one of these compliance areas. Nevertheless,
neither the Final Policy Interpretation nor the Investigator's Manual is
particularly good at cataloging these nondiscriminatory reasons. Some al-
leged nondiscriminatory reasons have been specifically allowed, while
others have been specifically rejected. This article makes no effort to dis-
cuss every possible nondiscriminatory reason an educational institution
may raise. Instead, this article discusses below some nondiscriminatory
reasons presented in the Final Policy Interpretation and some defenses
previously raised by educational institutions. In examining defenses raised
by educational institutions, courts should carefully examine the alleged
nondiscriminatory reason to ensure the reason is not a result of other
discrimination.
249
1. Team-by-team Differences: Allowed
Differences in teams, such as team-specific rules and regulations, are
allowed as an affirmative defense. 250 For example, if one team requires
more equipment or needs greater security for stadium events, an educa-
tional institution will not violate Title IX by reacting to the specific needs
of the particular team.
2. Temporary Annual Fluctuations: Allowed
Temporary annual fluctuations in the other athletics benefits area are
specifically allowed as an affirmative defense. 25 1 This prevents female ath-
letes from suing simply because the male athletes got more recruiting dol-
lars or other benefits in any one academic year.252 These annual
fluctuations are permitted to provide flexibility to the educational institu-
tion without exposing it to Title IX liability.
3. Voluntary Affirmative Action: Allowed
Voluntary affirmative action initiated by the educational institution to
correct historical conditions that have limited participation in athletics by
determining "substantial proportionality" under the first prong of the interests and abilities
compliance area test. Id.
249. For example, the Final Policy Interpretation allows as a defense to a violation of the
financial assistance compliance area that schools have more out-of-state male athletes, thus
requiring greater amounts of financial assistance. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at
71,415. Looking behind that reason, however, the Investigator's Manual points out that
schools had more out-of-state male student athletes because the schools recruited more for
men than for women. INVasnMATOR'S MANuAL, supra note 28, at 20. This discriminatory
recruiting practice cannot be upheld as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for failure to
provide appropriate amounts of financial assistance to women athletes.
250. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-16.
251. Id.
252. If greater benefits are afforded to men on a regular basis, as opposed to a single
academic year, the educational institution may be in violation of the other athletic benefits
compliance area.
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the members of one sex is an affirmative defense to a Title IX violation.253
Thus, if an educational institution maintained an athletic department
which had men as the overrepresented gender, the educational institution
could raise the affirmative action defense to correct past discrimination
against women to any suit brought by male athletes.
4. Compliance with NCAA or Other Rules: Rejected
An educational institution cannot hide behind the rules and regula-
tions of the NCAA or other such group as a defense for its discriminatory
conduct. The Regulations and the Final Policy Interpretation specifically
reject this as a defense.
254
5. Financial Constraints: Rejected
Many a school has claimed its hands are tied from complying with
Title IX because of the economic woes facing most of this country's educa-
tional institutions. As difficult as these economic times may be for educa-
tional institutions, "a cash crunch is no excuse."
255
Otherwise, if schools could use financial concerns as a sole rea-
son for disparity of treatment, Title IX would become meaning-
less. Under such circumstances, a school could always use a lack
of funds as an excuse to deny equality because it costs money to
implement equivalent women's programs with long standing
men's programs. This cannot be either the spirit or meaning of
Title IX.
2 56
6. Equal Reductions in Male/Female Athletic Programs: Rejected
An educational institution's protestations that it has not discrimi-
nated, but equally cut male and female teams, will likewise not serve as an
affirmative defense. An educational institution may not equally cut teams
when one sex is already underrepresented. To do so will almost always
result in a violation of the interests and abilities compliance area.
[W]here budget restrictions have led a recipient to eliminate
sports previously offered, there is frequently a compliance prob-
lem with this program component. The tendency is for institu-
tions to eliminate a sport previously offered to women who are
already underrepresented in the institutions' athletic programs.
The result has been that women are now more disadvantaged by
the elimination of a women's team despite sufficient interest and
ability to sustain a viable team. In this situation, the institution
may well be in violation of this program component.
25 7
253. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,416; 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) (1993).
254. 34 C.F.R. § 106.6(c) (1993) ("The obligation to comply with [Title IX] is not obvi-
ated or alleviated by any rule or regulation of any... athletic or other... association ...
see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422.
255. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583 (no exception to Title IX's requirements because of
school's financial difficulties).
256. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 750.
257. INVEsTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 27.
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just as ordinary budget reductions will not afford safe harbor, "equal op-
portunity" budget reductions will not justify the continuation of pre-ex-
isting gender inequality.
258
V. REMEDIES FOR TITLE IX VIOLATIONS IN ATHLETIc PROGRAMS
The stated remedy for a violation of Title IX is the withdrawal of fed-
eral funds from the noncomplying educational institution. 259 Neverthe-
less, Congress requires the Department of Education to notify an
educational institution of its failure to comply before withdrawing federal
funds or taking any other action against the institution.2 60 Moreover, the
enforcing agency must attempt to secure compliance by voluntary means
before taking any further action.
26 1
In practice, OCR has never withdrawn federal funds from an educa-
tional institution as a result of Title IX noncompliance in athletics. 262 In-
stead, as in the case of Colorado State University, the OCR makes repeated
attempts to secure compliance from the educational institution through
voluntary means and conducts periodic compliance reviews to ensure the
institution has met its goals.2 63 In effect, Title IX's twenty-year standing
threat of withdrawing federal funds has done little to bring compliance in
educational institutions across the country. 264 Regulatory remedies
against the institutions have proved worthless, perhaps because the
OCR has failed to take a hard line with noncomplying educational
institutions.
265
258. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831-32.
259. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Katherine Connor & Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in Stan-
dardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 77 (1992).
263. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513, 1515-16 (discussing OCR's 1983 compliance review
of Colorado State). Colorado State made several representations to the OCR in its corrective
action plan upon which OCR based its finding of Colorado State's "compliance" with Title
IX. Nevertheless, OCR specifically conditioned compliance on Colorado State's promise to
carry out the corrective action plan. Colorado State, however, did not meet the goals laid out
in the corrective action plan, failing to attain the female participation numbers it pledged it
would meet. Indeed, in some instances, Colorado State misrepresented participation num-
bers to the OCR. Id. at 1515-16.
264. See id., 814 F. Supp. at 1513 (noting Colorado State's evidence that every educational
institution in this country would be in violation of Title IX if 10.6% point differential is not
"substantially proportionate" and rejecting same as a defense for Colorado State); see also
Wieberg, supra note 78, at CIO (noting the disparity in 86 Division I-A schools of men's and
women's athletic funding); Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55 (noting lack of spending in most
aspects of women's sports).
265. OCR's action with respect to Colorado State provides a good example of agency
inaction. In OCR's compliance review of Colorado State, the agency did little to truly en-
force Title IX's provisions as it applied to the athletic department. At trial, it became known
that Colorado State had misrepresented its female participation numbers to the OCR. Trial
Transcript at 477, 483-85, Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No.
92-Z-1310) (testimony of Rosalyn Cutler, Colorado State Title IX Coordinator), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
Furthermore, as part of its compliance plan, Colorado State promised to build a softball
facility. Id. at 491-92. OCR based its original finding of compliance, in part, on this promise
to build a softball facility. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1516. Colorado State, however, never
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Private litigation, however, now poses a greater threat to educational
institutions if they fail to comply with Title IX's gender equity mandates.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,
2 6 6 which allowed a private litigant to recover money damages for a
Title IX violation, educational institutions are more likely to pay closer
attention to their Title IX obligations than ever before. 267 Broad injunc-
tive relief also gives schools an incentive to avoid Title IX litigation. This
portion of the article discusses the remedies available to successful plain-
tiffs under Title IX.
A. Injunctive Relief
The right to injunctive relief under Title IX seems to be beyond ques-
tion. In Franklin, the Supreme Court impliedly accepted without discus-
sion that a plaintiff could recover equitable relief for a violation of Title
IX.268 Furthermore, in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,269
a majority of the Supreme Court agreed injunctive and other equitable
remedies were appropriate for violations of Title VI,2 7 0 the statute on
which Title IX was modeled. Courts have followed these cases in imposing
injunctive remedies in Title IX athletics cases.
271
The question then is not whether injunctive relief is an available rem-
edy, but instead, what type of injunctive relief is available. In keeping with
the plain dictates of the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation, a
court may order an educational institution in violation of Title IX to cre-
ate a compliance plan demonstrating the school's intended actions to
remedy the violation. 272 Under such an equitable remedy, the court
would function much like the OCR by monitoring the educational institu-
tion's progress toward meeting the terms of the compliance plan. Finally,
the Roberts court suggested that an appropriate remedy in a class action
case would be to enjoin the violating institution's conduct of its men's
built the facility and never informed OCR of its failure to build the facility. Trial Transcript
at 492-93, Roberts (No. 92-Z-1310). OCR failed to learn of Colorado State's noncompliance,
never took any corrective actions against Colorado State, and never took any steps to with-
draw federal funds. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1515-16.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Guinnett County Public Schools discussed the
OCR's response to Ms. Franklin's administrative complaint: since the offending teacher had
resigned and the school had instituted a grievance procedure, the OCR found the district
had come into compliance and terminated its investigation. 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1031 n.3 (1992).
266. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
267. Id. at 1038 n.8.
268. See id. at 1032, 1036.
269. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
270. Id. at 584, 607 (White, J., writing the opinion for the Court in which four Justices
concurred in the judgment and four Justices dissented).
271. See Favia, 7 F.3d at 344; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-35; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906; Roberts,
814 F. Supp. at 1518-19; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 1001; Cook, 802
F. Supp. at 751.
272. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906 (stating the district court intended to require Brown Uni-
versity to propose a compliance plan rather than mandate the creation or deletion of particu-
lar athletic teams if Brown was found in violation of Title IX).
[Vol. 72:1
TITLE IX
varsity competition until the institution presented a plan which would
bring it into compliance with Title IX.
273
Plaintiffs, however, generally seek more specific injunctive relief to
remedy their injuries, such as the creation or reinstatement of a specific
women's athletics team. In every federal district court case thus far, plain-
tiff athletes have been granted the requested injunctive relief.274 Defend-
ant institutions, however, have challenged the courts' ability to impose
such specific remedies as the reinstatement of a specific team, claiming
the courts are inappropriately intruding on the institution's discretion.
275
Since Title IX does not require institutions to fund any particular number
or type of athletic opportunities, courts have been somewhat receptive to
this argument from the defendant institutions.
276
A distinction is developing based on whether the Title IX action is
brought by an individual plaintiff or as a class action. When a plaintiff has
brought a claim in her individual capacity, specific injunctive relief is ap-
propriate. 2 77 When, on the other hand, the action is brought on behalf of
a class, the more appropriate remedy may be broad-based injunctive relief
that gives educational institutions discretion in the manner in which they
will comply with Tide IX.2 7 8 In cases brought by athletes in their individ-
ual capacities, allowing an educational institution in violation of Title IX
to devise its own compliance plan would force plaintiffs to become "unwill-
ing representatives in a class action suit they chose not to bring."2 79 When
plaintiffs come as a class, however, "the many routes to Title IX compli-
ance make specific relief most useful in situations where the institution...
demonstrates an unwillingness or inability to exercise its discretion in a
way that brings it into compliance with Title IX."
2 80
District courts, however, are limited in the reach of their injunctive
relief, even when awarding specific relief. In Roberts, the district court or-
dered the reinstatement of the women's softball team.2 8 1 While monitor-
ing Colorado State's compliance with the court's order, the district court
ordered Colorado State to hire a coach promptly, recruit new members,
and organize a fall season of softball, all in response to Colorado State's
273. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833.
274. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1519; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583-85; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at
1001; Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 751.
275. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906; see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833 (arguing that institution
should have been given an opportunity to present a compliance plan).
276. See id.; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)
("As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.")
277. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-34.
278. Id. at 833. "Were this a class action, there might be some power to defendant's
argument that an order specifically requiring an institution to maintain a softball team goes
further than is necessary to correct a violation of Title IX." Id.; see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906-
07 (court will initially require university to propose compliance plan rather than court man-
dating teams added or deleted).
279. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-34.
280. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 ("In default by the school
authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad
power to fashion a remedy that will assure [compliance with federal law].")
281. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1519.
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apparent "foot-dragging."282 Colorado State complained that this ampli-
fied order from the district court amounted to "micromanaging" of Colo-
rado State's athletics program.
28 3
The court of appeals accepted this argument to some extent.
Although the district court could order Colorado State to provide the soft-
ball team with all incidental benefits of varsity status, it could not go be-
yond the mandates of Tide IX. The Tenth Circuit ruled, "[n]othing in
Title IX requires an institution to create a 'top flight' varsity team."
28 4
The Tenth Circuit further determined that the district court did not have
the power to ensure that the reinstated softball team had a good sea-
son.2 85 Where the district court's order was directed at eliminating a con-
dition which did not violate federal law, the court exceeded the
appropriate limits of its power.28 6 Since Tide IX mandates equal opportu-
nity in the other athletics benefits compliance area, 287 the district court's
order regarding coaching, recruiting, equipment, field schedules, and
uniforms was affirmed.2 88 These types of specific relief were appropriate
to remedy claims brought by plaintiffs in their individual capacity.
Choosing to bring an action in an individual capacity gives the plain-
tiff the advantage of obtaining specific, individual relief. Nevertheless, cer-
tain trade-offs accompany the decision to bring the suit in an individual
capacity. In Cook, the plaintiffs brought the action in their individual ca-
pacity rather than as a class action. 28 9 In the lower court, the federal mag-
istrate judge ordered Colgate University to grant varsity status to the
women's ice hockey team.290 When Colgate appealed this decision, how-
ever, the appellate court found the issue moot because all plaintiffs had or
would have graduated from Colgate by the time the injunctive relief was
to take effect.29 1 Plaintiffs' action did not fall within the exception to
the mootness doctrine for situations capable of repetition, yet evading
review.292
[T]hese plaintiffs may not litigate the claims of students un-
named and unrepresented in this action. We have suggested that
a student's claim may not be rendered moot by graduation if he
or she sued in a "representational capacity" as the leader of...
a[n] organization.... [H]owever, the complaint herein sought
282. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 826.
283. Id. at 834.
284. Id. at 835.
285. Id.
286. Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977), for the proposition that
federal court decrees exceed appropriate limits if aimed at eliminating conditions that do
not violate the Constitution or do not flow from the violation).
287. See supra part IV.A.2.
288. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834. The district court did not require Colorado State to provide
additional scholarships to its softball players. Nevertheless, Colorado State will have to com-
ply with the requirements of the financial assistance compliance area. See supra part V.A.1.
Otherwise, women athletes may bring a new suit for violation of that compliance area.
289. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 739.
290. Id. at 751.
291. Cook, 992 F.2d at 19.
292. Id. at 19-20 (citing Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
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damages and injunctive relief solely on behalf of the plaintiffs
individually, not as representatives of the women's ice hockey
club team or other "similarly situated" individuals.
29 3
In a class action suit, however, graduation of representative plaintiffs will
not render the case moot.
2 9 4
Furthermore, injunctive relief granted to individuals may have force
and effect only as long as those individuals remain students at the institu-
tion. Roberts suggested Colorado State could return to court and seek to
have the injunction dissolved once all individual plaintiffs had transferred
or graduated.2 9 5 Favia, on the other hand, held that modification of an
injunction is inappropriate in a class action simply because some of the
named plaintiffs have graduated.29 6 Given the remedial ramifications of
the status chosen, plaintiffs and their counsel must carefully weigh the rel-
ative advantages and disadvantages of proceeding as a class or as individu-
als. Plaintiffs must have in mind the injunctive remedies they wish to
recover before they file suit. Plaintiffs may attempt to find the best of both
worlds by bringing a class action suit on behalf of a specific athletic team, its
members, and all future members of the team. This approach could pre-
vent the mootness problem while preserving the ability to get specific in-
junctive relief, such as the reinstatement of the specific team.
Moreover, to obtain injunctive relief, plaintiffs must meet the stan-
dard test set out for injunctions:
(1) Success on the merits (or likely success for preliminary
injunction);
(2) irreparable harm to the plaintiffs;
(3) balance of interests between the parties, that is, whether the
harm to the plaintiffs outweighs the potential harm to a defendant if the
injunction is granted; and
(4) the public interest favors granting an injunction.
29 7
293. Cook, 992 F.2d at 20 (citations omitted).
294. See Favia, 7 F.3d at 344. Favia presented a case where the court ordered specific relief
for the representative plaintiffs in a class action suit. The complaint alleged the plaintiffs
represented all women students or potential students who participated or sought to partici-
pate in the intercollegiate athletic program sponsored by IUP. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579.
There are three possible reasons for Favia's apparent divergence from the class/individual
distinction drawn by Roberts and Cohen. First, reinstatement of those specific teams would be
an appropriate remedy for the affected subclass of plaintiffs if the named plaintiffs were
construed to be representatives not only of all women students but also of all actual and
potential members of the individual teams they represented. Favia, 7 F.3d at 342-43 (noting
that reinstatement would benefit the class, though to differing degrees as individuals, and
that women currently attending and planning to attend IUP would be interested in partici-
pating in gymnastics). Second, Favia notes that IUP did not have a specific overall plan to
achieve total compliance with Title IX. Id. at 344. Finally, Favia reviewed a preliminary, not a
permanent, injunction. To preserve the status quo, the district court ordered reinstatement
of the cut teams. Id. at 342. The court implied that final injunctive relief should be of the
more general, broad-based type suggested by Cohen for class actions. See i. at 344.
295. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834.
296. Favia, 7 F.3d at 342, 344.
297. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902 (citations omitted); Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583 (citation
omitted).
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1. Success on the Merits
Necessary elements of proof to establish success or likely success on
the merits have been discussed fully above. The other elements are dis-
cussed here.
2. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs may demonstrate irreparable harm in several ways. The
methods discussed and recognized by the courts have related to individual
and team harms. In Cohen, for example, the court found that the poten-
tial harm from Brown University's decision to cut women's teams would be
irreparable to the teams cut: "[P]laintiffs would suffer irremediable injury
in at least three respects: competitive posture, recruitment, and loss of
coaching."298 Favia recognized the irreparable harm to the individual
athletes:
By cutting the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams, IUP
has denied plaintiffs the benefits to women athletes who compete
interscholastically: they develop skill, self-confidence, learn team
cohesion and a sense of accomplishment, increase their physical
and mental well-being, and develop a lifelong healthy attitude.
The opportunity to compete in undergraduate interscholastic
athletics vanishes quickly, but the benefits do not. We believe
that the harm emanating from lost opportunities for the plain-
tiffs are likely to be irreparable.
299
3. Balancing the Interests
The only harm raised by a defendant institution thus far has been a
financial one. Courts have soundly rejected financial constraints as an ex-
cuse for discrimination.30 0 Thus, the financial harm to defendants is out-
weighed by the irreparable harm plaintiffs will suffer as a result of
defendant's unlawful gender discrimination.30 ' Defendants can always re-
allocate resources which have been historically designated for men's ath-
letics or a school may cut back in other areas.
30 2
4. Public Interest
As stated succinctly by the district court in Favia, "[t]he public has a
strong interest in the prevention of any violation of constitutional
rights."3
03
If a plaintiff can demonstrate success or likely success on the merits,
other athletics cases under Title IX support the imposition of injunctive
relief. Indeed, the elements other than success on the merits are nearly
298. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
299. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583.
300. E.g., Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 530 ("[F]inancial concerns alone cannot justify gender
discrimination.").
301. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 905; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584.
302. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584.
303. Id. at 585.
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presumed given the nature of the violation in an athletics claim. Thus,
injunctive relief is a remedy plaintiffs can anticipate with certainty, should
plaintiffs clear the success on the merits hurdle. As discussed above, how-
ever, the nature of that injunctive relief will be determined based on the
status of the plaintiffs before the court.
B. Monetary Relief
The Supreme Court's decision in Franklin laid to rest the question
whether a plaintiff could recover monetary damages in a private right of
action under Title IX.3 0 4 The unanimous Court gave real leverage to vic-
tims of educational institutions' gender discrimination by holding that Ti-
tle IX relief includes, among other things, compensatory damages. 30 5
Franklin was a sexual harassment case wherein a high school teacher/
coach sexually harassed and assaulted a female high school student. De-
spite lower court decisions, the Supreme Court held that the student was
entitled to compensatory damages under Title IX for the emotional dis-
tress she had suffered as a result of the sexual harassment. 30 6 Relying on
precedent, the Court presumed Congress intended all appropriate reme-
dies, including monetary relief, to be available under Title IX since Con-
gress did not express a contrary intent.30 7 Indeed, Justice Scalia noted
that Congress has twice addressed Title IX since a private right of action
was implied by Cannon and implicitly acknowledged that damages are
available.
3 08
The question left unresolved is whether a plaintiff must prove inten-
tional discrimination to recover compensatory damages under Title IX.
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished other cases that held com-
pensatory damages were not recoverable by stating those cases dealt with
unintentional discrimination. Since the facts before the Franklin court in-
volved intentional discrimination, the Court did not address the applica-
tion of those cases to Title IX3 0 9 and did not decide whether proof of
intent is a prerequisite to the recovery of monetary damages.3 10
Those who argue that damages are not recoverable for unintentional
discrimination incorrectly point to the Supreme Court's decision in Guard-
304. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
305. Id. at 1032.
306. For a discussion of Franklin and its history, see Note, supra note 9.
307. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1032 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
308. Id. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Amendment of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1988) (withdrawing States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (1988) (providing that, in suits
against States, "remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for [viola-
tions of Title IX] to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a
suit against any public or private entity other than a State")) (emphasis added).
309. Id. at 1037. The main case distinguished by the Franklin court was Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), because it involved a case of unintentional
discrimination under the Spending Clause. The Court never determined to what extent, if
any, Pennhurst would apply in cases of unintentional discrimination under Tide IX.
310. Some courts have misconstrued Franklin's limited holding and interpreted it as pre-
cluding the recovery of monetary damages except in cases of intentional discrimination. E.g.,
Houston v. Mile High Adventist Academy, 846 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 (D. Colo. 1994).
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ians Association v. Civil Service Commission.3 1 1 In Guardians, the Court dis-
cussed the award of compensatory damages under Title VI.3 12 The
plaintiffs sought monetary compensation for unintentional discrimination
as a result of the disparate impact the New York City Police Department's
testing policy had on racial minorities. The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals' award of compensatory damages for the disparate impact
discrimination, but there was no majority opinion discussing the reason
for the reversal. Given the confusion caused by the multiple opinions,
some commentators have incorrectly construed Guardians as having ruled
that compensatory damages are not recoverable for a claim of uninten-
tional discrimination.
3 13
In fact, there was no majority on whether compensatory damages are
recoverable for unintentional discrimination. Justice White, joined byJus-
tice Rehnquist, was the onlyJustice in Guardians to express such an opin-
ion.3 14 Justice Powell, joined by ChiefJustice Burger, opined that Title VI
did not afford a private right of action at all, and, if it did, it only allowed
such private actions for intentional discrimination.31 5 He did not reach
any further issues. Justice O'Connor asserted that discriminatory intent
was a necessary element of Title VI claims and that the implementing reg-
ulations allowing otherwise were invalid.3 16 She did not reach any further
issues. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens all agreed that
retroactive and prospective relief are available for intentional and unin-
tentional discrimination under Title VI. 3 17 Justice Stevens opined that
monetary relief was available for violations of the implementing regula-
tions through disparate impact discrimination. 3 18 Thus, a majority of the
Supreme Court has not ruled, under Title VI or Title IX, whether com-
pensatory damages are recoverable for unintentional discrimination.3 19
311. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). Title VI, dealing with racial discrimination, is the statute
upon which Title IX was modeled. See supra note 241.
313. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 1372 (stating Guardians court determined Title VI did
not authorize award of compensatory damages for unintentional discrimination). In con-
struing similar anti-discrimination provisions under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 7 94(a) (1988), some courts have relied on Guardians to deny monetary damages in in-
stances of disparate impact discrimination. See, e.g., Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Schs., 725
F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984).
314. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591-603.
315. Id. at 609-11. Justice Powell's opinion as to no private right of action was rejected
soundly by a majority of the Court in Cannon. Moreover, five justices in Guardians specifically
agreed that a claim could be stated under Title VI for unintentional discrimination. Lower
courts have followed this reasoning in Tide IX cases and rejected Justice Powell's opinion in
Guardians. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832.
316. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 612-15. A majority of the Guardians court rejected this opin-
ion. See supra note 315.
317. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id at 645 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, 1J.)
318. Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. But see Consolidated Rail Corp. v, Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 631 n.9 (1984) (noting a
majority of the Guardians court agreed that "retroactive relief is available.., for all discrimi-
nation, whether intentional or unintentiona4 that is actionable under Tide VI") (emphasis ad-
ded); Franklin, 112 S. CL at 1035 (quoting same).
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A closer analysis of Title IX, the Regulations, the Final Policy Inter-
pretation, and the scant cases construing them, demonstrates that com-
pensatory damages are recoverable even in instances of unintentional
discrimination. Courts must start with the presumption set forth in Bell v.
Hood: "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done."320 Absent congressional
limitation on the remedies available under a statute, the general principle
set forth in Bell v. Hood must control.
321
The only previously suggested limitation on the general Bell v. Hood
principle is the limitation typically placed on Spending Clause legislation
as set forth in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.32 2 In holding
in Guardians that compensatory damages were not recoverable under Title
VI, Justice White resorted to this limitation on Spending Clause legisla-
tion, which he determined Title VI to be.323 Relying on Pennhurst, Justice
White held that "make whole" remedies are typically not appropriate
under Spending Clause legislation. 3 24 Spending Clause legislation is
much like a contract: in return for federal funds, recipients agree to com-
ply with federally imposed conditions.3 2 5 To be valid, those conditions
must be knowingly accepted by the institution. 32 6 The Court held that
where a recipient is in violation of the legislation, the recipient should be
given the option of complying or withdrawing and terminating the receipt
of federal funds.
32 7
However, Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, distinguished
Pennhurst and held that even though Title VI was Spending Clause legisla-
tion, compensatory damages need not be limited solely to cases of inten-
tional discrimination.3 28  Justice Marshall persuasively argued that
Pennhurst was inapplicable to the facts before the Court in Guardians since
Pennhurst found the violation urged by plaintiffs was not an actual "condi-
tion" imposed on recipients of federal funding.32 9 Pennhurst merely dis-
cussed what obligations were imposed as a result of the statute at issue in
that case. It never discussed what consequences flow from the failure to
comply with a known condition. 33 0 Unlike the statute at issue in Pen-
nhurst, Title VI clearly imposes the condition on recipients of federal
funds that no person shall be denied benefits or subjected to discrimina-
tion on the basis of race. 33' Therefore, argued Justice Marshall, recipients
320. Bel, 327 U.S. at 684; Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033.
321. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1034-35.
322. 451 U.S. 1, 17; see also Guardians, 463 U.S. at 596 (White,J.) (construing limitations
on damages under Title VI, which was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause).
323. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598.
324. Id. at 596.
325. Pennhurs, 451 U.S. at 17.
326. Id.
327. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 596-98.
328. Id. at 628-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 628-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
330. See id. at 628-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 629 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of funds under Title VI have ample notice that their programs must not
have any discriminatory effect.
332
Similarly, providing an environment free from discriminatory effect is
also a clear requirement of Title IX. The statute states that no person
shall, on the basis of sex, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to
discrimination by an educational institution that receives financial assist-
ance.33 3 Title IX does not specify that the denial of benefits or discrimina-
tion be intentional. Indeed, given the strong directive that no person shall
be subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex, the statute encompasses
any form of discrimination, intentional or disparate impact. The statute's
clear language prohibits all discrimination. Thus, by accepting federal fi-
nancial assistance, educational institutions agree to comply with the condi-
tion that no person in their programs shall be subjected to any form of
discrimination. The existence of disparate impact discrimination in a fed-
erally funded educational institution is a violation of the plain language of
Title IX.
3 3 4
Furthermore, the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation also
support the argument that avoiding all forms of discrimination is a condi-
tion of receiving federal funds. In providing athletics, the Regulations re-
quire educational institutions to provide "equal athletic opportunity" to
members of both sexes.3 3 5 No distinction is drawn for unequal opportuni-
ties that result from unintentional discrimination. Moreover, the Final
Policy Interpretation directs a finding of compliance or noncompliance to
be based on "whether the policies of an institution are discriminatory in
language or effect."33 6 Like the clear language of Congress expressed in
Title IX, the clear language of the implementing agency demonstrates
that Title IX covers intentional and disparate impact discrimination based
on sex. Educational institutions, therefore, have clear notice that, by ac-
cepting federal funds, they are under an obligation to maintain an envi-
ronment in which no person is subjected to any form of discrimination.
The Pennhurst limitation is inapplicable to Title IX for another rea-
son. The Supreme Court impliedly rejected the idea that educational in-
stitutions should be protected from unknown "conditions" when it
implied a private right of action under Title IX in Cannon.33 7 As a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon, additional "conditions" were
imposed on recipients that were not known before the Cannon decision.
These conditions include costs of hiring counsel and defending a private
action, monetary liability for attorneys' fees, and costs of complying with
332. Id. at 629-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
333. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
334. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 628-32 (Marshall,J. dissenting) (arguing educational insti-
tutions are fully aware of the nondiscriminatory "conditions" placed on them by Title VI and
that disparate impact discrimination violates these "conditions").
335. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1993).
336. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2 at 71,417, 71,418 (emphasis added) (defin-
ing standards under other athletic benefits and interests and abilities compliance areas).
337. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709-10.
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injunctive relief.3 3 8 Likewise, courts should reject the argument that fed-
erally funded educational institutions should be protected from monetary
damages for disparate impact discrimination because this is a new "condi-
tion" not previously known to them. The purpose of Title IX was to pro-
tect individuals from discrimination, not to protect schools.
33 9
Finally, it is not altogether clear that Title IX was passed solely pursu-
ant to the Spending Clause. Petitioners in Franklin argued that Title IX
had also been passed under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.3 40 Since the Supreme Court found that
Pennhurst did not prevent the award of compensatory damages in cases of
intentional discrimination, the Court never decided under what authority
Congress passed Title IX.3 4 1 The legislative history of Title IX, however,
supports the argument that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guar-
antees of equal protection are sources of authority for Title IX: "Tide IX is
an anti-discrimination law. It prohibits discrimination based on sex in ed-
ucational institutions that are recipients of Federal assistance. The legisla-
tive history of Title IX clearly shows that it was enacted because of
discrimination that ... was being practiced against women in educational
institutions."3 42 "Millions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury
and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for the support
of institutions to which we are denied equal access." 343 Title IX was
passed "[i]n view of the scope and depth of the discrimination" against
338. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Swygert, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion based on Pennhurst and fully chroni-
cling added "conditions" as a result of Cannon), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982). These
"conditions" imposed by virtue of creating a private right of action can have a higher mone-
tary impact than a compensatory damages award. Counsel for Colorado State's softball play-
ers, for example, sought over $400,000 as an interim award for attorneys' fees not including
time spent on the Tenth Circuit oral argument or Colorado State's petition for certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court. See Plaintiffs' Motion for an Interim Allowance of Attorneys' Fees
and Costs Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
at 26, Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No. 92-Z-1310), aff'd in
part, revd in part sub nom., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
339. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1191 n.3 (SwygertJ., dissenting).
340. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038 n.8.
341. Id. One federal court has held Title IX is Spending Clause legislation and denied
the recovery of any compensatory damages under Title IX. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1187. Title
IX was classified as spending power legislation because the expenditure of federal funds for
educational institutions justified the imposition of the prohibition against sex discrimination.
Id The Lieberman court concluded, prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin, that
compensatory damages were not recoverable for a claim of discrimination under Title IX.
Only injunctive relief and attorneys' fees were allowed. Id. at 1188. Nevertheless, Lieberman's
ultimate decision, that no damages are recoverable in any instance, has been clearly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Franklin. Moveover, the dissent in Lieberman persuasively argued
that Pennhurst was inapplicable to Title IX in the same way Justice Marshall argued it was
inapplicable to Title VI. Finally, Lieberman never considered whether Title IX had been
passed pursuant to another source of congressional authority such as the Fourteenth
Amendment.
342. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,423.
343. Comments of Representative Mink, 117 CONG. Rac. 39,252 (1971); see also Cannon,
441 U.S. at 704 n.36 (discussing legislative intent of Title IX).
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women in educational institutions.3 44 The main purpose is not to aid
schools through funding, but to prevent the use of federal funds to sup-
port gender discrimination and to remedy past discrimination. 345 Thus,
the Fifth Amendment, which gives Congress broad authority to remedy
past discrimination,3 4 6 is a source of congressional authority for Title IX.
In applying the Bell v. Hood principle of awarding all appropriate rem-
edies, courts should award compensatory damages even in instances of dis-
parate impact discrimination. Congress has addressed Title IX twice since
the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon implying a private right of ac-
tion. 34 7 In both instances, fully aware of the Cannon ruling, Congress de-
clined to limit the private right of action in any manner, choosing instead
to expand plaintiffs' rights under Tide IX.3 48 In the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act, Congress broadened the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City
College v. Bell,349 which limited the application of Title IX to specific pro-
grams or activities within schools receiving federal funds, by defining pro-
gram or activity to mean all the operations of a college or university.
3 50
More telling is the fact that in the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act,
Congress waived states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to litigation
under Title IX and under other civil rights legislation. 35 1 In doing so,
Congress directed that all remedies otherwise available, both legal and eq-
uitable, are available against a state. Apparently, Congress anticipated that
legal remedies, including damages, would be available in Tide IX
litigation.
35 2
Congress has made no attempt to limit the application of the tradi-
tional presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies for a violation of a
federal right to Title IX.353 Certainly, an analysis of the remedial provi-
sions under Title IX confirms that Congress has not limited the recovery
of compensatory damages under Title IX to instances of intentional dis-
crimination.3 54 In Title VII, Congress specifically limited the recovery of
monetary damages to instances of "intentional discrimination (not an em-
344. H.R. RFP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,
2512.
345. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
346. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 901.
347. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 1, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)); Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
506, t. X, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988)).
348. Unlike its silence under Title IX, Congress has specifically addressed, and limited,
the remedies available under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (Supp. V 1993). Con-
gress provided that a complaining party under Title VII may obtain compensatory and puni-
tive damages where a respondent/defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. Id.
349. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
350. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 ("[T]he term 'program or activity' and 'program' mean[s] all the
operations of... a college, university ......
351. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
352. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Congress had
implied a damages remedy under Title IX).
353. Id. at 1036.
354. Id. at 1035-36.
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ployment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)."3 55
Having thus demonstrated its ability to limit the recovery of monetary
damages when it chooses, Congress refrained from so limiting Title IX's
remedies. Since Congress conspicuously failed to place remedial limita-
tions on Title IX similar to those placed on Title VII, Bell v. Hood mandates
that all remedies apply for claims of intentional and unintentional discrim-
ination.3 56 Whether compensatory damages is an appropriate remedy is
an issue left to the sound discretion. of the court.
3 5 7
Despite the multiple opinions in Guardians, a later Supreme Court
decision, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darone,35 8 found a majority of the
Guardians court agreed that retrospective relief, or back pay, was a form of
compensation to which a Title VI plaintiff was allowed whether the dis-
crimination was intentional or not.3 59 The Court so held because retro-
spective compensation was deemed a form of equitable relief.360 Future
damages are also recoverable under Title IX.36 1 Failure to provide pro-
spective monetary relief would deny some plaintiffs the benefit of any rem-
edy. For example, if an athlete were in her senior year when a school
decided to cut her sport in violation of Title IX, retrospective compensa-
tion would be inapplicable. Moreover, future injunctive relief would be of
no value to the graduating plaintiff. Only future money damages can rem-
edy that plaintiff. In such instances, courts should avoid limiting remedies
where doing so will deny a plaintiff any remedy at all.3 6 2 "If no relief were
available to [plaintiff] here, it would be pointless to remand to the district
court. An exercise to find liability without finding a remedy would be an
exercise in futility."
3 63
In order to assure that a plaintiff who has suffered a wrong has a rem-
edy, courts should not limit Franklin to cases of intentional discrimination.
Victims of discrimination must also be allowed to seek remedies for the
discriminatory effect of school actions and policies. In many instances of
discrimination within federally funded athletic departments, however,
proving intentional discrimination may not be a very difficult task. Each
institution has specifically chosen to offer different participation opportu-
355. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (Supp. V 1993). Although Title VII and Title IX are similar
in that they prohibit discrimination, they differ in their focus and purpose. Title VII is a
deterrence-based statute, focusing on the discriminatory actions of employers. "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer - [enumeration of prohibited acts]." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Title IX, on the other hand, is an impact-oriented statute, focus-
ing on the discriminatory effect on victims of gender discrimination. "No person .. .shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from . .. or be subjected to discrimination ... ." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1988).
356. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033, 1035.
357. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 634 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stating that issue of compen-
satory damages in intentional and disparate impact discrimination is best decided by federal
district courts as triers of fact).
358. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
359. Id. at 630 & n.9.
360. See id. at 630 n.9, 631 n.10.
361. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038 (holding that future damages and emotional distress
damages were recoverable in Title IX litigation).
362. Id.
363. Pfeiffer v. School Bd. for Marion Ctr. Area, 917 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 1990).
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nities to athletes based on their gender (for example, men's basketball v.
women's basketball). Moreover, each institution has full control over the
number of athletic opportunities, the financial aid, and the other athletic
benefits provided to members of each sex. Therefore, the educational in-
stitution's deliberate acts of distributing athletic opportunities and re-
sources in a manner which continually favors men is intentional, not
accidental or unintentional, discrimination. Although there is probably
no intent to discriminate against the individual herself, there is intent to
discriminate against women as a group when favoring and preferring men
as a group.
One can easily contrast intentional discrimination by an athletic de-
partment with disparate impact discrimination by looking at the facts in
Guardians.36 4 The plaintiffs in Guardians presented a claim of uninten-
tional discrimination resulting from the disparate impact a facially neutral
police entrance exam had on racial minorities. 36 5 In giving the entrance
exam, the police department was not purposely trying to eliminate minori-
ties as police department applicants. Instead, the test indirectly limited the
number of racial minorities in hiring and limited minorities' promotion
and job retention because the test contained a racial bias.3 66 Likewise,
one could argue that educational institutions may indirectly discriminate
against women or minorities because they require college entrance exams
that contain a gender or racial bias. This would be an instance of dispa-
rate impact or unintentional discrimination.
Unlike the disparate impact of a race or gender biased test, failure to
provide proportionate athletic opportunities to women is direct, inten-
tional discrimination by the institution. The institution's conscious acts to
offer only a discrete number of positions to women is a deliberate and
direct limitation on their ability to participate in athletics. Although
schools may provide separate teams to men and women athletes,
3 67
schools may not provide unequal athletic opportunity. A school would be
hard pressed to argue that it accidently failed to provide women with more
athletic opportunities. It is difficult to imagine a school accidentally, yet
consistently, maintaining participation numbers at a level 10% to 15%
lower than female enrollment rates. Likewise, a school intentionally deter-
mines the amount of financial aid it will award to women athletes, the
number of new uniforms they will have, and whether women athletes will
travel to away games by bus while their male counterparts travel to the
same location by airplane.
Intention, under tort law, is not necessarily a hostile intent or a desire
to do any harm to the injured party. Instead, intent is defined as taking
deliberate actions designed to bring about a result that will invade the interests
of another in a way that the law does not sanction.36 8 It is the deliberate
364. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582.
365. Id. at 585.
366. Id. at 585-86.
367. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,417-18.
368. WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971).
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act which is the focus, not the concomitant effect on others. Applying the
same analysis to Title IX, the school's deliberate act of providing fewer
participation slots, operating dollars, and financial assistance to women
must be the focus, not whether the school, by taking these actions, in-
tended harm to any individual female athlete.
Thus far, no court has reached the issue of monetary damages in a
Title IX athletics suit.3 6 9 Based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin
and the general principles stated therein, however, all monetary relief
should be available to female athletes who prove a violation of Title IX
whether or not they prove discriminatory intent. The question of damages
is one of proof and not one of substantive law. Courts should allow female
athletes to present evidence of all damages and award all appropriate re-
lief3 70 regardless of the educational institution's intent. Discriminatory ef-
fect is the issue.
C. Altorneys'Fees
As prevailing parties, plaintiffs371 are entitled to attorneys' fees in-
curred in pursuing their Title IX claims. 3 72 "In any action or proceeding
to enforce a provision of ... [Title IX] ... the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party .... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs. " 3 7 3 Although the award of attorneys' fees is discretionary, 374 a pre-
vailing plaintiff should recover fees unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust.3 75 The purpose of awarding attorneys' fees
is to "ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil
rights grievances."
376
Fee awards are designed to give attorneys incentive to prosecute civil
rights actions which they would otherwise be unable or unwilling to prose-
cute.3 77 Many Title IX athlete plaintiffs will be college-aged (or younger)
students with limited financial resources. Moreover, the potential legal
fees for these actions far outweigh what a student-plaintiff might win as
compensatory damages at trial, making a contingency fee structure unap-
369. Colorado State settled the damages portion of its suit with the softball player plain-
tiffs. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833. In Cook, the district court denied plaintiffs monetary dam-
ages because plaintiffs were fully aware before matriculating that Colgate did not sponsor a
varsity women's ice hockey team. Cook, 802 F. Supp at 751. That case, however, did not
discuss whether damages were generally available to remedy a Title IX violation or whether a
plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination to recover such a remedy.
370. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1032.
371. If defendants are found to be prevailing parties, they too may be entitled to attor-
neys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. V 1993). Nevertheless, the standard for the recovery
of attorneys' fees by a defendant is far more stringent than by a civil rights plaintiff. To
recover attorneys' fees, a defendant must prove that plaintiff's claims were frivolous, unrea-
sonable, or groundless. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422
(1978) (discussing fees under Title VII).
372. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976)).
376. Id.
377. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 1983).
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pealing to potential counsel. Thus, the award of fees is necessary to en-
sure that these claims will be prosecuted by competent counsel.
Finally, the award or the potential award of attorneys' fees provides a
strong incentive to educational institutions to comply with Title IX. Coun-
sel for Colorado State's softball players, for example, sought an interim
award of attorneys' fees of over $400,000.378 This request did not include
fees for appellate arguments to the Tenth Circuit or briefing in response
to Colorado State's petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. An award of attorneys' fees of this size will cause educa-
tional institutions to re-think their priorities within their athletic depart-
ments, providing those institutions with the incentive to come to early
settlements with plaintiffs should litigation be initiated. Accordingly, at-
torneys' fees themselves become an integral remedy necessary to the
proper enforcement of Title IX and other civil rights statutes.
CONCLUSION
After twenty years of virtual paralysis in its application to athletics,
Title IX is becoming the vehicle for gender equity that Congress intended
it to be. Indeed, in the last few years, courts have recognized Title IX
claims concerning unequal athletic benefits and expanded the remedial
arsenal available to female athlete litigants. Moreover, female athletes are
using litigation as an effective weapon to vindicate women's rights to ath-
letic equality that historically have been denied by schools. After two de-
cades of struggling to implement a law that on its face prohibits gender
discrimination, women have finally made courts recognize that "[e]qual
athletic treatment is not a luxury .... Equality and justice are not luxu-
ries.... They are essential elements now codified under Title IX."
'3 79
Gender discrimination in school-sponsored athletic departments is
still rampant. Nevertheless, Title IX litigation, with its potential for money
damages and wide-ranging injunctive relief, provides the first real hope for
bringing true gender equity to athletics. In the Title IX litigation arena,
women athletes have just begun to level the athletic playing fields. Despite
admirable initial litigation victories by women athletes, Title IX athletics
litigation is in its infancy. Many issues have yet to be reached or resolved
by federal courts. This article discussed many of those unresolved issues
and presented substantive and procedural methods for analyzing claims of
Title IX violations in athletics in hopes of continued pursuit of expanded
athletic opportunities for women. Courts should implement these sub-
stantive and procedural guidelines to permit the continued effective use of
Title IX litigation to bring gender equity to athletics.
378. See Plaintiffs' Motion for an Interim Allowance of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant
to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, at 26, Roberts v.
Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No. 92-Z-1310), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart
sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 580 (1993).
379. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 750.
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